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ABSTRACT
The Distinction Problem of Self-Deception
by
CHAN Chi Yin
Master of Philosophy

The essential task of the investigation of self-deception is nothing more than
establishing the boundary of it, herein known as the distinction problem of
self-deception. Such a boundary is necessary for distinguishing the phenomenon of
self-deception from other similar phenomena, especially wishful thinking, and sheds
light on the future research of other theoretical questions posed by the phenomenon.
Although philosophers have reached a vague consensus on certain necessary elements
involved in the phenomenon of self-deception, there is no general agreement on their
details, leading to a lack of canonical literature regarding the question of what makes
self-deception a unique phenomenon.
In this thesis, I begin by attempting to re-establish the initial definition of
self-deception by illustrating the vague consensus in the current discussion of
self-deception. Then, several representative views are examined to uncover the
reason(s) for their failure to capture the distinction between self-deception and other
kinds of irrationality. These findings are then used to clarify what the basic structure of
self-deception should be. Finally, I develop an account revealing that the distinction
problem is related to the study of the necessary attitude(s) involved in self-deception.
My analysis shows that a special kind of instability inherent in the necessary attitude(s)
involved in self-deception is the key to establishing self-deception as a distinctive case
of motivated irrationality.
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INTRODUCTION: SELF-DECEPTION AS A KIND OF HUMAN IRRATIONALITY
It is widely accepted that ordinary people are generally rational beings who can
think, talk, act, and acquire knowledge or understanding based on or being agreeable to
reason. The definition of “rationality” or “being rational,” however, could be a very
controversial topic of debate. For the purpose of introducing the idea, an intuitive
approach for discussing this definition might suffice for the moment. It seems to most
people that our reasons to believe and for action should be grounded in what the world
is, namely, the truth, at least in a rough sense. Given that people usually assume that
“evidence” would indicate “truth” (in a rough sense), we might say the initial idea of
being “rational” is to do things based on what the available evidence suggests. This
idea is also concurred on by many philosophers. For example, Russell (1996) asserts
that when we decide whether to believe in a particular proposition, we have “the moral
duty of veracity,” which “consists of two coequal precepts: ‘believe truth,’ and ‘shun
error’” (p. 769). In order to fulfill this duty, we ought to “[g]ive to any hypothesis
which is worth [our] while to consider just that degree of credence which the evidence
warrants” (Russell, 1996, p. 770).

Nevertheless, there are times when normal people do not seem to obey this
evidentialist way of behaving. The following scenario, suggested by Van Leeuwen
(2007) and referred to by me as the case of “an overrated son,” should not sound
strange to most people:

Suppose your friend’s son is underperforming in school, doesn’t read a lot,
and doesn’t get the jokes that most kids his age get. Suppose also your
friend insists that his son is “very smart” and in fact “smarter than most
1

other kids his age.” Knowing your friend almost never lies and certainly
wouldn’t to you, and knowing him to be no fool in general, you see that
he’s deceiving himself. (p. 420)

Let us assume that your friend is not making a random mistake and should have the
ability to acknowledge the contradicting evidence. In this scenario, on the one hand, it
looks like your friend somehow successfully came to believe that “my son is very
smart” – after all, this is what he verbally endorses. On the other hand, it seems
impossible that your friend, who should be normally rational, would acquire such an
unwarranted belief in the face of strong (but not conclusive) evidence to the contrary.
Since it is quite obvious that your friend has a personal stake in the matter, you
(pre-theoretically) suspect that he deliberately ignores the unwelcoming evidence and
makes himself believe in the unwarranted belief – as Van Leeuwen (2007) describes,
your friend might be self-deceiving. So, it is fair to say this case of “an overrated son”
looks like a typical example that we would (pre-theoretically) refer to as a case of
human irrationality, namely, self-deception.

We have therefore arrived at one of the puzzling subject matters of
philosophical debates. There has been a big controversy surrounding the topic of
self-deception. What is it to be self-deceived? If it is what the name suggests,
self-deception appears to be knowingly making oneself believe what one takes to be
false. How could a generally “rational” person deliberately make herself believe
something that she recognizes as false? Does a self-deceived subject acquire an
unwarranted belief or a certain kind of irrational state that can roughly play the role
played by “belief”? How could we decide whether a particular case should be a
2

“paradigm” example of self-deception? What is the difference between self-deception
and other seemingly similar phenomena?

Maybe we could deny that there is such a kind of irrationality.1 The subject in
the case of “an overrated son” is merely trying to lie to others without engaging in an
irrational mental action or process. The advantage of this assertion is obvious – we can
get rid of those theoretical puzzles seemingly stemming from “self-deception.”
Nevertheless, the disadvantage is that we may deny a real phenomenon. These are all
familiar stories that most of us might have occasionally engaged in. Consider a friend
who claims that he believes in his partner’s faithfulness even though convincing
reasons have led everyone else to believe otherwise, or a businesswoman who insists
that she will be successful again despite kind suggestions grounded in good evidence
from others to cut losses. Based on our real-life experience, we cannot simply agree
that such a “self-deceiving” situation is nothing more than just lying to others.
Accordingly, we do not have to defend the case of “an overrated son” as a
(theoretically) genuine case of self-deception in order to argue for the existence of
“self-deception,” since the evidence for believing so is pervaded in our daily mental
life.

How should we account for self-deception and the questions stemming from
this phenomenon? If the phenomenon behind “self-deception” is a genuine one and
hence a genuine subject of study, the most fundamental work would be to establish the

1

Some might argue that self-deception is a kind of rationality. I will not deny such a
possibility, but I am not going to investigate it either, as the literature tends to consider
self-deception as a kind of irrationality (see section 1.2.2 for more details).
3

boundary of it (or the application of the term “self-deception”). By drawing this line,
we could reach a general agreement on what it means to be self-deceived and suggest
certain paradigm cases for providing a solid base for further discussion. However, as
Funkhouser (2009) points out:

It would be nice if theorists interested in self-deception could start with an
agreed upon understanding of the phenomenon – what it even means to be
self-deceived and what are some of its paradigm examples – and then
proceed from that starting point to address the various theoretical problems
that it appears to pose. But, it should come as no surprise to any philosopher
with any experience that there is no such shared understanding of what it
means to be self-deceived. (p. 1)

Undoubtedly, theorists who attempt to give a detailed account of self-deception turn
out presenting pictures that are very different from each other (as we will see in section
1.1). Despite this, since these suggested theories (are supposed to) target the same kind
of phenomenon, there must be some commonalities among them. Hence the primary
question of studying self-deception becomes whether there exists a common ground in
the current discussion, and whether this consensus, if present, is enough for
establishing the boundary of self-deception.

Ideally, this boundary should provide adequate guidance to separate
“self-deception” from not only different kinds of rationality but also other types of
irrationality. Philosophers who are interested in this study (like Szabados (1973)) find it
more challenging to decide what makes self-deception different from other nearby
phenomena than what makes it an irrational phenomenon. Yet, most philosophers (for
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instance, Nelkin (2002)) still turn to focus on providing a detailed analysis of
self-deception while hoping that the issue of dividing self-deception from other kinds
of irrationality could be solved fortuitously by what they suggest. However, I consider
it to be an impulsive move to account for self-deception in detail without first
distinguishing its distinctive feature(s). As mentioned before, the first step should be to
determine whether there is a common ground in the current discussion of
self-deception, which could provide clues on the next step.

The purpose of this thesis is to establish a firm foundation for future research
on the phenomenon of self-deception. I will show that, in order to draw the boundary
of self-deception, we need more than a vague consensus on its general features, as
presented in the current literature. Specifically, a special kind of instability inherent in
the necessary attitude(s) concerning p involved in self-deception can help us to set up
the line between self-deception and other nearby phenomena.

This thesis will consist of three parts. In chapter 1, I will present an overview of
the current discussion on self-deception and introduce the various points of view
available. Then, I will illustrate the “vague consensus” on the initial idea of
“self-deception” in the literature and explain why it is not enough to serve as a basis for
further analysis. In chapter 2, I will examine different solutions to the issue with the
assumption that self-deception should be a unique kind of irrationality. We will see this
examination will eventually lead us to reconsider how we should specify the
combination of the awareness of the available evidence and the necessary attitude(s)
concerning p accurately. Based on this, in chapter 3, I will clarify the basic structure of
5

self-deception, which will give us an idea of viewing “self-deception” in a new fashion.
It will be demonstrated that the combination can be understood as an integrated entity
that is unstable in character, and the idea of “the necessary attitude(s) concerning p”
also calls for a new understanding. More importantly, my analysis will show that, by
laying emphasis on the unstable nature of the necessary attitude(s), a promising
solution to the issue can be drawn.

6

CHAPTER I - THE PREPARATORY WORK FOR THE STUDY OF THE
DISTINCTION PROBLEM
1.1 The current discussion of self-deception
The literature on the phenomenon of self-deception is a complex mixture of
views that are quite different from each other. Philosophical analyses of self-deception
could be separated into two main groups: intentionalist and non-intentionalist.2 As
Lynch (2009) illustrates, theoretical differences between the groups “can be traced in
large part to two different approaches to how the concept of self-deception should be
properly analysed, usefully distinguished by Alfred Mele,” which can be called the
“lexical approach” and the “empirical approach” (p. 126).3 Moreover, there are also
significant disagreements on the details of self-deception within the groups.

1.1.1 Intentionalism/traditionalism
Traditionally, philosophers take the lexical approach to start their investigation
on self-deception, which leads them to establish “a definition of deception from the
interpersonal case and [use] it to deduce the meaning of ‘self-deception’” (Lynch,
2009, p. 127).4 Since there is a deceiver intentionally getting a victim to believe a

2

Nevertheless, as Lynch (2009) notes, many philosophers “take up mixed positions” between
these two groups (p. 126). See Galeotti (2012) as an example of a mixed strategy.
3 As Mele (n.d.) suggests, there is a third approach called the “theory-guided” approach (para.
5). If we take the third approach to investigate self-deception, “the search for a definition is
guided by common-sense theory about the aetiology and nature of self-deception” (Mele, n.d.,
para. 5). But Mele (n.d.) does not specify the common-sense theory, nor is it easy to see
whether he has an example of this approach in his mind.
4 As Lynch (2009) notes, “these two approaches are somewhat idealized, and it can be difficult
to find a philosopher who explicitly and exclusively adopts one” (p. 126). Therefore, we should
not assume that intentionalists are required to adopt the lexical approach exclusively. A more
precise description would be that they largely rely on the lexical formula and the interpersonal
model generated by it.
7

proposition that p while knowing or believing truly that not-p in a standard case of
interpersonal deception, the lexical formula of self-deception should be as follows:

When A deceives himself, A intentionally/deliberately causes himself to
believe something he knows/suspects is false. (Lynch, 2009, p. 128)

Based on the interpersonal model, they infer that there are three necessary elements in
a real case of self-deception: a true belief that not-p, an intention to deceive oneself that

p, and a false belief that p. Owing to the intentional nature of the suggested model,
proponents of this model are often referred to as “intentionalists.”

Despite the consensus on how to start the investigation, intentionalists disagree
on how to address these three elements. Hence different versions of intentionalism
exist, which can be divided into two subgroups. Some intentionalists insist that
self-deceived subjects are required to hold the belief that p while also believing that
not-p simultaneously (Davidson, 2004b; Rorty, 1988). Yet, as Lynch (2009) notes, “it’s
not obvious why the lexical derivation as it stands would necessarily imply this
[requirement]” (p. 128). Therefore, it is not surprising to see that the others, such as
Sorensen (1985), argue that the two central beliefs can be held by the subject
consecutively.

Furthermore, disagreement arises within the two subgroups as well. In the first
subgroup, for example, different opinions exist on how exactly the simultaneous model
can be accommodated in a single agent’s mind. Some philosophers follow the idea of
“partitions in the mind” proposed by Dennett in 1992, which argues that “the mind is
8

not a unified system but rather a problematically yoked-together bundle of partly
autonomous systems” (as cited in Rorty, 1988, p. 17). These systems are sub-agencies
co-existing in the mind, which are capable of belief, desire, and intention but not
“accessible to each other at all times,” and therefore the two contradictory beliefs will
be held separately by different “possessors” (Ibid.). In contrast, Davidson (2004b)
rejects such a strong position and proposes a relatively modest version: “there can be
boundaries between parts of the mind” and these “boundaries are not discovered by
introspection; they are conceptual aids to the coherent description of genuine
irrationalities” (p. 211). In this sense, “we should not necessarily think of the
boundaries as defining permanent and separate territories” (Davidson, 2004b, p. 211).
Instead, they are temporary tools that a self-deceived subject uses for keeping her false
belief that p apart from the true belief that not-p (Ibid.).

1.1.2 Non-intentionalism/revisionism
In the other group, that is, non-intentionalism, the situation is even more
complex. Rather than the lexical approach, philosophers in this group rely more
heavily on the empirical approach. As described by Mele (1987), by following the
empirical approach:

One starts by gathering and constructing cases that would generally be
described as self-deception, and then attempts to develop an analysis of
self-deception on the basis of a consideration of this material. The meaning
of ‘self-deception’ is determined by the cases, which are therefore the most
fundamental data. (p. 13-14)
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As a result, these philosophers take into account “how ordinary people actually use the
expression ‘self-deception’” and move away from the lexical formula proposed by
intentionalists (Lynch, 2009, p. 127). By rejecting the formula, they refuse to adopt an
intentional picture of self-deception – thus the name “non-intentionalists.” There are
two families of views that can be considered non-intentionalism: “deflationary”
approaches and “non-doxastic” approaches. Both of them suggest that self-deception is
an unintentional causal mechanism, and numerous accounts are announced based on
this initial idea.

1.1.2.1 Deflationary approaches
Mele’s (2001) deflationary account, one of the most well-known versions of
deflationism, suggests that the jointly sufficient conditions for “entering self-deception

in acquiring a belief that p” are:

1. The belief that p which S acquires is false.
2. S treats data relevant, or at least seemingly relevant, to the truth value of p
in a motivationally biased way.
3. This biased treatment is a non-deviant cause of S’s acquiring the belief
that p.
4. The body of data possessed by S at the time provides greater warrant for
[not-p] than for p. (p. 50-51)

In order to understand the idea more clearly, consider the case of “Beth” suggested by
Mele (2012):

Beth is a twelve-year-old whose father died recently. Owing partly to her
desire that she was her father‘s favorite, she finds it comforting to attend to
10

memories and photographs that place her in the spotlight of her father‘s
affection and unpleasant to attend to memories and photographs that place a
sibling in that spotlight. Accordingly, she focuses her attention on the
former and is inattentive to the latter. This contributes to Beth’s coming to
believe – falsely – that she was her father’s favorite child. In fact, Beth‘s
father much preferred the company of her brothers, a fact that the family
photo albums amply substantiate. (p. 5)
In short, Mele (2001, 2012) proposes that if a subject has a desire that p and then
acquires a false belief that p in a motivationally biased way, we will be justified to
recognize that the subject is deceiving herself.

Although other deflationists concur with Mele (2001, 2012) on the rejection of
contradictory beliefs, their explanation of the data gathered from the (alleged) cases of
self-deception varies, hence producing pictures of self-deception that are quite different
from Mele’s. Both Audi (1982) and Rey (2009), for example, disagree with Mele’s
answer to the doxastic question of self-deception. Audi (1982) proposes that a standard
case of self-deception should be described as follows:

S is in self-deception with respect to p if and only if
(1) S unconsciously knows that not-p (or has reason to believe, and
unconsciously and truly believes, not-p);
(2) S sincerely avows, or is disposed to avow sincerely, that p; and
(3) S has at least one want which explains in part both why the belief that
not-p is unconscious and why S is disposed to disavow a belief that not-p,
and to avow p, even when presented with what he sees is evidence against
it. (p. 137)

11

Using Audi’s (1982) account, the best way to explain the case of “Beth” would be that
Beth unconsciously knows that she was not her father‘s favorite child (not-p), but she
is motivated to avow that “I was my father’s favorite child” (p) because of a
corresponding want(s).

On the other hand, a few deflationists come up with new ideas on both the
doxastic question and the motivational issue of self-deception. Funkhouser’s (2005)
second-order belief view, for example, proposes that the sketch of an analysis of
self-deception should be as follows:

An agent is self-deceived at time t if and only if:
1. The agent at t possesses sufficient evidence to warrant a belief that not-p.
2. The agent at t believes that not-p.
3. However, the agent at (and since sometime before) t desires to believe that

p.
4. This desire, by prompting characteristic deceptive strategies, causes the
agent to believe, at t, that she believes that p.
5. The agent at t does not believe that she believes that not-p. (p. 308-309)

Based on Funkhouser’s (2005) view, in the case of “Beth,” apart from holding the

evidence-warranted belief that she was not her father‘s favorite child (not-p), Beth also
acquires a false second-order belief concerning p, namely the belief that “I believe that
I was my father’s favorite child,” because of a desire to believe so. The difference in
Audi’s (1982) and Funkhouser’s (2005) version of deflationism is a typical example of
the diversity of views on the topic.

12

1.1.2.2 Non-doxastic approaches
According to Archer (2013), non-doxasticism is a relatively recent view that is
“simply assumed for the sake of argument that the self-deceived person does not
possess both purported beliefs” (p. 266). Yet, we should notice that, apart from directly
denying the attribution of the two central beliefs to self-deceived subjects, proponents
of non-doxasticism can choose to propose a more modest claim that “it is genuinely
indeterminate what they believe with respect to p” (Funkhouser, 2009 p. 15). Although
the proponents might have the same (or at least similar) opinion on the doxastic issue
of self-deception, they are presenting almost incompatible perspectives on the study of
self-deception, as illustrated by a comparison of Archer’s (2013) and Funkhouser’s
(2009) view in the following.

By limiting the subject of study to isolated “paradigm” cases proposed by
herself, Archer (2013) argues that “[there is] no explanatory need to attribute the
self-deceived person either their undesired or their desired belief” since we can appeal
to psychological categories other than “belief,” such as suspicion and anxiety, for
explaining self-deception (p. 267). Consider the “desperate husband” case suggested by
Archer (2013):

[T]he husband begins to suspect that his wife may be having an affair and,
immediately, his defences go up. He strongly desires to believe that his wife
is faithful to him. The combination of this desire and his suspicion explains
why he begins to avoid information in favor of his feared conclusion and
seek out evidence against it, and distort any evidence he finds. Engaging in
such biased evidence gathering, he prevents himself from coming to hold
his undesired belief that his wife is having an affair. Even so, there is
13

significant disquiet in his mind regarding the issue: he is anxious that it not
be the case that his wife is having an affair, he has niggling doubts about the
information he already has, but he hopes that it is not the case that she is
unfaithful to him. Nonetheless, his niggling doubts and suspicions prevent
him from attaining the belief that it is not the case that his wife is having an
affair. (p. 279)

Unlike deflationists such as Mele (2001, 2012), Archer (2013) agrees with Funkhouser
(2005) that the motivation for self-deception should be a desire to believe. More
importantly, Archer (2013) suggests that different affective attitudes (such as suspicion
and hope) will prevent the involved subjects from attaining both the contradictory
beliefs (which concern p and not-p).

On the other hand, Funkhouser (2009) targets a particular type of self-deception
– “deeply conflicted self-deception” – in which there is “non-trivial tension” between
one’s actions, responses, or emotions, etc. (p. 4). Funkhouser (2005) presents “Nicole”
as a paradigm example of deeply conflicted cases:

Nicole possesses much evidence that her husband Tony is having an affair
with her friend Rachel. Nicole’s other friends have reported to her that
Tony’s car is often seen parked in Rachel’s driveway, at times when he
claims to be with his male friends. Tony has lost sexual interest in Nicole,
and other suspicious behavior provides sufficient evidence for Nicole to be
more than skeptical. Yet she laughs off the concerns of her girlfriends, and
thinks to herself that Tony is certainly a faithful husband. (“After all, I am
still an intelligent, charming, and attractive woman – certainly more so than
Rachel!”) Yet, in the evenings when Tony claims to be with his male
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friends, Nicole avoids driving by Rachel’s house – even when it requires

her to drive out of her way. (p. 302)

Funkhouser (2009) contends that conflicting cases like this manifest the limit of
the folk-psychological concept of “belief” and force us to reconsider how an account of
belief should be developed (p. 4). Specifically, Funkhouser (2009) suggests that a
subject’s beliefs consist of their status with respect to various “regarding-as-true
stances,” which can be classified into at least seven categories, such as theoretical
reasoning, behavior, internal reports, and emotion (p. 6-9). When “all the plausible
candidates for weighing the different regarding-as-true stances [towards p] converge on
the same result,” we can easily tell whether a subject believes in p (Funkhouser, 2009,
p. 11). But there are also complex cases in which there can be conflicting
regarding-as-true stances, such as the case of “Nicole.” Since no privileged weighting
should be given to any regarding-as-true stance, we have no reason to think that a
determinate answer concerning whether Nicole believes that “Tony is a faithful
husband” (p) can be provided (Funkhouser, 2009, p. 10-11).

The seemingly contradicting views of Archer (2013) and Funkhouser (2009) is
noteworthy because, while Archer (2013) claims that we can perfectly account for
self-deception by appealing to psychological categories other than belief, Funkhouser
(2009) holds a negative attitude towards the power of folk psychology. However, this is
not where their paths diverge, since Funkhouser (2009) aims at showing the limit of
“belief” but not of all psychological categories. The real difference between them lies
in their consideration of the role played by emotions in our daily life. Specifically,
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Archer (2013) emphasizes the causal role of different emotions played in the
constitution of actions, while Funkhouser (2009) believes that emotions are only
responses (or reactions) towards various objects (including people or events) (p. 8).5 To
be more precise, Funkhouser (2009) contends that emotions should merely “count as
regarding-as-true stances [towards] a proposition” but not causes of other actions (p.
8). In this sense, Archer’s (2013) and Funkhouser’s (2009) non-doxastic pictures of
self-deception are contradictory.

The previous discussion is just the tip of the iceberg in the sea of the
unreasonably wide range of accounts that are (seemingly) incompatible with each
other. Some philosophers, such as Lynch (2012) and Van Leeuwen (2007), worry that
the variety of accounts of self-deception might lead us to mistakenly discuss
phenomena that are actually of different types.6 Nevertheless, as will be discussed in
the following, a vague consensus on the initial definition of self-deception can still be
reached with the help of the theories of self-deception available in the literature.

1.2 Re-establishing self-deception: the vague consensus
The diversity of the literature brings up the question of whether there is a
common ground shared by the different theories currently available in the study of
self-deception. Van Leeuwen’s (2007) answer to this, which I concur, is that “there is

5

Funkhouser (2009) might admit that emotions would be manifested in reflex reactions such
as screaming loudly while feeling scared. Hence emotions are somehow related to observable
behaviors. However, I assume that Funkhouser (2009) would deny that emotions can play a
significant role in the deliberation and planning of actions.
6 This would not be a problem if “self-deception” were not an independent notion. It is possible
that the real phenomenon behind “self-deception” could overlap with, or be the same as, the
one behind another notion.
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lack of consensus about specific details of self-deception amid vague consensus about
some of its critical components” in the literature.

The “lack of consensus” has been illustrated in section 1.1. The “vague
consensus,” according to Van Leeuwen (2007), is that “self-deception” refers to a real
phenomenon with three “critical components”:

There is fairly general consensus in the literature that self-deception exists.
So we might think that deny the phenomenon went out with the days of
hard-nosed, literalistic ordinary language conceptual analysis. [...] First, it is
widely agreed that some motivational attitude is constitutively involved in
causing self-deception; I shall call this the deceptive element. Second, it’s
uncontroversial that the self-deceiver has to have some sort of access to
information that would justify believing the doxastic alternative. Third, it
seems agreed that the product of self-deception is some cognitive attitude,
where a cognitive attitude is one that can be evaluated as true or false – as
opposed to conative attitudes, like desires. (p. 421-422)

Yet, it should be emphasized that Van Leeuwen’s (2007) view is not representative of
all theorists, nor should it be presupposed that most theorists agree that the result of the
self-deceiving process is a cognitive attitude which has a truth value. Apart from Van
Leeuwen (2007), Funkhouser (2009) also proposes a preliminary idea of this “vague
consensus”:

[This] is widely accepted: self-deception is some kind of motivated
irrationality, in which the self-deceiver fails to handle the evidence
available to her appropriately. Controversy arises when we try to specify the
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nature of this motivation and the resulting doxastic state of successful
self-deception. (p. 2)

However, it is noteworthy that Funkhouse (2009) somehow takes for granted that most
theorists admit that self-deception should produce a certain doxastic state as its
product.

Here, with both of these views in mind, I propose the “vague consensus” shared
by (at least) the large majority of the theorists interested in self-deception, which is also
the initial theoretical description of self-deception for the purpose of the current study,
to be as follows:

Self-deception is a real kind of motivated (human) irrationality, which is
constituted by the combination of three basic elements. These elements are
“motivation,” “access to information,” and “unwarranted attitude.”

I am going to explain more details of this description. But it should be noted
that the present task is abstracting the foundational assumption underlying (at least) the
large majority of the theories available in the literature, and thus forming a (vague)
consensus as the basis for the study. Consequently, I will avoid emphasizing on one
particular theory or hastily providing a detailed analysis of self-deception.

1.2.1 A real phenomenon
Considering the large number of theorists working on self-deception, it is fair to
say that there is at least a widespread assumption in the literature that self-deception is
a real phenomenon. However, can available theories really give support to such an
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assumption? Instead of examining the theories one by one, we may directly look at the
two main approaches – the “lexical approach” and the “empirical approach” – once
again and see whether they could offer some insights into the matter.

Some philosophers point out that those theorists who adopt the lexical approach
usually end up suggesting accounts that make people skeptical about self-deception
(Borge, 2003; Mele, n.d.). Recall that proponents of the lexical approach consider the
self-deceiving process to be an intentional one in which an involved subject who
believes that not-p comes to acquire a belief that p. Borge (2003) illustrates that this
interpretation of self-deception generates the paradox of self-deception:

What puzzles us in purported cases of self-deception is the idea that the
deceiver and the deceived are supposed to be one and the same person. The
very idea of self-deception prima facie suggests that self-deception must, at
least to a certain degree be analogous to interpersonal deception. If there is
not an intentional or conscious attempt from some agent to mislead or
misinform, then there is no deception. If this deception is not conducted
reflexively by the agent in question, then the deception is not intrapersonal
but interpersonal or between a person and a deceptive environment, and
there is no self deceiving itself. The problem is that even though the notion
of self-deception is part of our folk psychology, the folk-psychological
notions of “belief,” “deception,” and “self” seem, on closer inspection, to
rule out the very possibility of self-deception. How can you trick yourself to
believe something you do not believe? Folk psychology seems to lack the
resources for explaining what goes on in the cases that we call
self-deception. (p. 4)7

7

As Mele (2001) argues, this interpretation also generates the “static paradox” of whether it is
a psychologically-possible state of mind for someone to hold contradictory beliefs (p. 6-7). I
will talk about this in section 2.2.1 and section 2.6.
19

This concern can also be referred to as the “dynamic paradox” originally suggested by
Mele (2001):

On the one hand, it is hard to imagine how one person can deceive another
into believing that p if the latter person knows exactly what the former is up
to, and it is difficult to see how the trick can be any easier when the
intending deceiver and the intended victim are the same person. On the
other, deception normally is facilitated by the deceiver's having and
intentionally executing a deceptive strategy. If, to avoid thwarting one's
own efforts at self-deception, one must not intentionally execute any
strategy for deceiving oneself, how can one succeed? The challenge is to
explain how self-deception in general is a psychologically possible process.
(p. 8)

Borge (2003) notices that intentionalists typically tend to “give up the idea of
the self as a fully rational integrated system” by going with the partitioned view of
mind in order to solve the paradox (p. 4-5). Hence Borge (2003) argues that those
views that appear to take the lexical interpretation seriously “have the so-called
paradox of self-deception re-emerging at some other level of analysis” (p. 1). Borge
(2003) takes Davidson’s 1986 work as an example, which suggests that there are
temporary boundaries for separating the self into different sub-units in the mind,
“mak[ing] it possible for one sub-unit to sincerely believe that p, while causing another
unit to believe that contrary” and hence no dynamic paradox reminds (as cited in p.
4-5). Nonetheless, Borge (2003) questions if the partitioned view could save the lexical
project:

20

But the self-deception was supposed to be self-induced. And if that were so,
then must not the boundaries have been drawn by a monitoring unit,
whether that be the self or the deceiver sub-unit, which somehow sees that
without such a boundary the person would believe a contradiction? But then
that unit must in turn have combined the two contradictory beliefs for it to
see the need for a boundary and the paradox of self-deception re-emerges.
Now what if there is “always already” a boundary that can be exploited? If
“exploited” means that the deceiver sub-unit purposefully exploits the
already existing boundary, then, again, that unit must combine the two
contradictory beliefs in order to see that it needs to take advantage of an
already existing boundary to reach its goals. If “exploits” merely means that
there is a cognitive process leading up to the two contradictory beliefs and
that process could not have been possible without the boundary, then there
is deception taking place but no deceiver. (p. 5)

Since the intentional model of self-deception offered by the lexical approach (in a strict
sense) seems to be paradoxical and thus suggests an impossible phenomenon, Borge
(2003) concludes that intentionalism eventually gives support to the claim that “there is
no such thing as self-deception” (p. 1).8

On the other hand, Mele-type theories, that is, those based mainly on the
empirical approach, can easily bypass the issue of whether self-deception is a real
phenomenon, because “Mele’s methodology takes the legitimacy of people’s
customary use of ‘self-deception’ for granted and just asks what goes on in the cases so

8

However, intentionalists might also investigate the lexical definition of self-deception with
“little relevance to our understanding [of] ordinary self-deception, just as the lexical analysis of
self-teaching has little relevance for our understanding of ordinary self-teaching” (Lynch, 2009,
p. 131). The invisible hand account of self-deception proposed by Galeotti (2012) and the
agentive non-intentionalist theory suggested by Lynch (2017) are examples of such a way of
investigation.
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referred to” (Lynch, 2009, p. 129). Consequently, supporters of the empirical approach
could safely assume the existence of self-deception, since the term would not be an
empty one as long as people are using it in their daily life.

1.2.2 A motivated (human) irrationality
In saying that self-deception is a motivated (human) irrationality, the focus
should be placed on the keywords “being motivated” and “irrationality.” The idea of
“being motivated,” if taken literally, means “being caused by a reason(s).” Owing to
this interpretation, “motivation” should be closely related to this feature since it is
referred to as “a reason for behaving in a certain way.” More details of the idea of
“motivation” will be presented in the next section. “Irrationality,” when associated with
human behavior, is normally referred to as “the quality of being unreasonable or
lacking sound reasoning” or “the fact that something is influenced or caused by an
action or thought that is unreasonable.”9 Recall the introduction, in which the initial
idea of “what it is to be rational” was presented. It is easy to see the idea of “being
unreasonable” is usually defined in an evidentialist way. The question, then, arises: do
the theorists of self-deception think about the idea of “being rational/irrational” in this
way?10

9

Certain kinds of cognitive processes or mental functions, such as reasoning and formation of
belief/knowledge, are supposed to be involved in the phenomenon of “irrationality,” since it is
nonsensical to blame someone (or something) without any mental ability for being irrational.
10 Note that considering that the idea of “irrationality” which is specifically referred to in the
“vague consensus” is constituted by the combination of three basic elements as previously
mentioned, therefore, this combination has to reflect a certain kind of irrational nature. The
details of the basic elements will be discussed in the coming sections.
22

It will be demonstrated in the following that theorists who study the
phenomenon of self-deception concur with the initial idea of “being rational” that has
been mentioned earlier. I have briefly explained this initial idea, yet an elaboration of it
might be quite useful. The initial idea of “being rational” is an evidentialist one. In the
eyes of ordinary people, being rational requires deliberating and taking actions
(including thinking, decision making, talking, acquiring beliefs or knowledge, etc.) in a
way that agrees with or is based on the truth (at least in a rough sense). Regarding the
idea of “truth,” people usually assume that something (such as a hypothesis, a
proposition, and a belief) could be taken as true if it is in accordance with (or is
grounded in) logic or an adequate reason(s). The notion of logic is generally accepted
to be “the principles of valid inference” or “the methods of human thought” by both
laymen and theorists. On the other hand, “evidence” could serve as “adequate reason”
under ordinary circumstances for many people. For example, to see whether the given
hypothesis “it rained” (h) is true, you would look outside the window and see if the
ground is wet. In this case, wet ground is the evidence for h. Consequently, to be
rational is (at least) to deliberate and take actions in a way that follows, or is based on,
what the evidence supports.11

11

“Evidence” is normally considered as consisting of observable entities or events, beliefs,
memories, etc. For example, I observed a man with long hair taking things without paying for
them (e1). Then e1 is the evidence for “this man with long hair is a thief” (h). Let us say I take
e1 to be true and thus hold a belief that h. A few days later when I saw the man with long hair
being arrested by the police (e2), I thought to myself “he is arrested probably because of
stealing!” In this situation, my guess is grounded in my belief that h (or the memory that “I
observed a man with long hair taking things without paying for them”) and e2. Some
philosophers, such as Williamson (2002, p. 194-200), refuse to take “evidence” as being
composed of (perceptual) experiences, and wonder if we need evidence for “evidence.” See
Williamson (2002) for further discussion on questions like “what should count as ‘evidence’”
and “what is the evidence for ‘evidence.’” But these are out of the scope for this study, and will
be adopted an intuitive interpretation.
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Many philosophers share this intuitive perspective on the relations between
“rationality,” “believing something to be true,” and “evidence.” For example, in
epistemology, there are evidentialists, such as Feldman and Conee (2004), who state
that “the epistemic justification of a belief is determined by the quality of the believer's
evidence for the belief” (p. 84). More precisely:

Doxastic attitude D toward proposition p is epistemically justified for S at t
if and only if having D toward p fits the evidence S has at t. (p. 84)

Some theorists, like Kelly (2002), directly point out that the rationality of our
belief-forming activities is determined by whether they are grounded in the evidence
we possess:

Our paradigm of an irrational belief is not that of a belief which predictably
leads to the frustration of the believer’s goals, but rather that of a belief
which is held in the face of strong disconfirming evidence. An athlete who
has an overwhelming amount of evidence that she is unlikely to do well,
and bases her belief that she is unlikely to do well on that evidence, would
seem to qualify as a rational believer – even if her rational belief frustrates,
in foreseeable and predictable ways, her goal of doing well. (p. 165)

Even though the findings of the various theories of self-deception differ
markedly (as discussed in section 1.1), almost all of them express an evidentialist view
of rationality as they emphasize that self-deception is a kind of irrationality because the
involved subjects do not act in accordance with, or based on, what the available
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evidence supports.12 For example, Davidson (2004), a proponent of intentionalism,
claims:

The irrationality of the resulting state consists in the fact that it contains
inconsistent beliefs; the irrational step is therefore the step that makes this
possible, the drawing of the boundary that keeps the inconsistent beliefs
apart. (p. 211)

Accordingly, in the intentionalist model of self-deception, this phenomenon is
irrational because the involved subjects intentionally make it possible that they can
believe in a false (or at least unwarranted) proposition (p). Given that the evidence they
possess is already enough for them to obtain a belief that not-p (namely the true or at
least evidence-warranted proposition), they should have a strong epistemic reason not
to do so.

Likewise, non-intentionalists also draw special attention to the irrationality of
self-deception by emphasizing specific actions of the involved subjects that are not
taken in an evidentialist way. We might take Archer’s (2013) non-doxastic view as an
example:

[T]he nondoxasticist can readily explain the irrationality involved in
self-deception without appealing to either belief: self-deception is
(epistemically) irrational simply insofar as it involves biased evidence
gathering, and, in some cases, a failure to believe what the evidence one
possesses supports. (p. 280)

12

“Being available” means “being available to the subject involved in self-deception” but not
“being available to the impartial observers.”
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Archer (2013) views self-deception as irrational because the evidence-gathering
involved in it is taken forward in an anti-evidentialist way from the very beginning.
That is to say, self-deceived subjects try to acquire knowledge by distorting the
available evidence instead of referring to what the evidence naturally implies. In
addition, Archer (2013) mentions that there might be cases of self-deception in which
the subjects possess enough evidence for deducing that not-p, but somehow fail to
acquire a belief that not-p (p. 280). In these cases, since the given disbelief is not
(epistemically) justified by the available evidence, it is fair to say the involved subjects
act contrary to what the available evidence suggests, and thus, are irrational.

In short, there is a general agreement in the literature of self-deception, namely,
this phenomenon is assumed to be epistemically irrational. The reasons provided by the
literature are also consistent with our intuitive idea of being irrational, as well as the
philosophical criteria of epistemic irrationality that have been suggested elsewhere.

1.2.3 The motivation-element
As mentioned in the previous section, the term “motivation” could be
understood as “a reason for behaving in a specific way.” If self-deception is assumed to
be a kind of motivated irrationality, it would imply that there is a motivation(s) for this
phenomenon, which serves to reveal the irrational nature of it. For this purpose, the
“motivation” for self-deception, herein termed the “motivation-element,” could not be
just any “reason,” and thus, must be clearly specified.
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To this end, it is useful to first discuss whether any behavior caused by a
motivation(s) must be (epistemically) irrational. In reality, a large majority of human
behaviors are considered to be motivated, including those that are generally regarded as
examples of human rationality, such as logical reasoning and formations of
(epistemically rational) belief. For example, there are quite a few philosophers who
propose that “(epistemically rational) beliefs” actually aim at the truth (Owens, 2003;
Pedrini, 2012; Wedgwood, 2002). This truth-oriented nature of “believing (rationally)”
(or “formations of (epistemically rational) belief”) suggests that this type of human
rationality can also count as a kind of motivated behavior, and the motivation for it
would be an aim of representing the truth.13 Given this, it is evident that the
motivation-element without any specification could fail to highlight the irrational
nature of self-deception.

The simplest way to solve the motivational issue would be to differentiate
between motivations on the basis of being (epistemically) rational or not, though this
would demand a meaning for a motivation to be rational. The literature reveals that
13

Some philosophers argue that there are beliefs, such as religious beliefs, that are not
intrinsically aimed at truly representing what the “world” is. For example, Noordhof (2009)
writes:
[T]here are those who self-consciously take their belief in God to involve a leap in
faith not supported by the evidence. They may also appreciate that their belief in
God stems from the way their motivational states influence their belief-forming
processes. They are happy to recognize this because fundamentally they approve
of their belief in God. It seems to them psychologically and spiritually the right
thing to believe. Indeed, the possibility of treating the evidence relating to God's
existence as just evidence to be assessed in disinterested terms seems to fail to
capture the importance of this belief for them. (p. 60-61)
Although there are philosophers who doubt whether we can believe in God (Rey, 2009), let us
assume that religious “beliefs” are indeed beliefs. Yet, we should notice that even though
(epistemically rational) beliefs should aim at the truth, this “aiming-at-the-truth” needs not be a
necessary constituent of all kinds of “belief.” The presence of the “aiming-at-the-truth” might
be treated as one of the normative requirements for “beliefs” to be epistemically rational.
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theorists who are interested in self-deception typically consider the motivational issue
by adopting an evidentialist approach, which is unsurprisingly consistent with how
they see the irrationality of self-deception as a whole (as discussed in section 1.2.2).
Despite the disagreement on the precise content of this “motivation,” they consider the
motivation-element to be a certain agential or subjective reason(s) that consists of
motivational attitude(s), such as desire (Archer, 2013; Davidson, 2004b; Funkhouser,
2005; Galeotti, 2012; Mele, 2001; Nelkin, 2002; Pedrini, 2012). I will discuss more on
this in section 2.2.

Nevertheless, it is imperative to note that the presence of this
motivation-element is only a necessary but not sufficient condition for counting a
certain case as an example of (successful) self-deception. Consider a case in which a
subject has a subjective reason for believing in a false proposition that p, yet she
simply, or perhaps reluctantly, acknowledges that not-p. If we do not stress the
importance of the other two elements, this given subject will also count as engaging in
an irrational phenomenon. Since one needs not necessarily engage in self-deception
because of one’s want, the “motivation-element” should not be considered as the only
decisive feature of self-deception.

1.2.4 The access-to-information-element
As mentioned in section 1.2.2, theorists take an evidentialist approach in
dealing with the issue of “irrationality” and assume that self-deception is irrational,
because those involved subjects fail to behave in a way that is consistent with, or based
on, what the available evidence implies. Let p stands for the proposition that the
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ongoing self-deception is about. Such an assumption requires us to admit that those
involved subjects must have access to information about whether p or not-p, or we just
set up an unfair situation, where the subjects cannot behave in an evidentialist way
from the very beginning. I propose to name this feature as the
“access-to-information-element.”

Similar to the motivation-element, certain restrictions are required on the
specification of this access-to-information-element for the irrationality of
self-deception to be revealed. For this purpose, theorists typically try to specify the
nature of the “information” (namely the available evidence) and that of “access,”
respectively.

Theorists agree that the available evidence should not provide greater warrant
for p than for not-p, otherwise one has no reason at all to engage in self-deception with
respect to p. Thus, there are two possibilities concerning the nature of this available
“evidence”: either it provides greater warrant for not-p than for p or it is ambiguous
(that is, the evidence in favor of p is neither greater nor weaker than the evidence in
favor of not-p). Given that intentionalists contend that self-deceived subjects should
hold contradictory beliefs, they are required to choose the first option. After all, if the
available evidence can be ambiguous, it will be incomprehensible why self-deceived
subjects hold a belief that not-p (while a belief that p is generated through the
self-deceiving process). On the other hand, not all non-intentionalists think that
self-deceived subjects must hold a belief that not-p, but most of them also take the first
option. I will present more details in section 2.3.
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As for the nature of such access, the large majority of theorists propose that it
should be internal access in the sense that it has to be represented by the attribution of a
certain attitude(s) in one’s mind. Since theorists insist that the available evidence must
not overall support p, most of them agree that self-deceived subjects should have a
particular attitude(s) that can reveal some appraisal of this situation, despite different
views on whether they are conscious of this attitude(s). The minority, like Mele (2001)
and Nelkin (2002), claims that this access is merely an existing method or opportunity
of figuring out the natural implication of the available evidence. In view of this
disagreement, I prefer not to hastily assume that such access must be encoded in one’s
conscious mind for the time being. I will discuss whether a conscious appraisal is
required in the model of self-deception in section 2.3.1.

It should be noted that, despite the above-mentioned restriction on the
access-to-information-element, merely having such access would not make things
irrational. As with the motivation-element, having such access is only a prerequisite,
but not the only crucial condition, for engaging in an epistemically irrational cognition.

1.2.5 The unwarranted-attitude-element
Recall there are three elements constituting the irrationality of self-deception, as
mentioned in section 1.2. Apart from the two elements mentioned in the previous
paragraphs, theorists also reach a consensus that an unwarranted attitude(s) towards p
is necessarily involved in self-deception while the acquisition or maintenance of which
is grounded in, or at least related to, the cognitive process involved in the phenomenon.
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For this study, I will refer to this feature the “unwarranted-attitude-element,” and I will
also call it the “necessary attitude(s)” when I consider that unwarranted attitude(s)
towards p in particular, though it has also been termed the product of self-deception by
some theorists (like Van Leeuwen (2007)). And, the cognitive process involved in
self-deception will be termed the “self-deceiving process.”

In the lexical/intentionalist model, one cannot be considered to have
successfully self-deceived until there is an acquisition of an unwarranted belief that p
(namely the necessary attitude), which is generated through the self-deceiving process.
From the non-intentionalists’ viewpoint, a reason for adopting the idea of the
“unwarranted-attitude-element” is that there is a need to attribute an unwarranted belief
that p to self-deceived subjects for explaining their behavior (Mele, 2001, 2012).
However, as discussed in section 1.1, some non-intentionalists think that the necessary
attitude(s) should not be considered as a doxastic one. For example, while Audi (1982)
claims that we can explain one’s behavior, which seemingly suggests a belief that p, by
the attribution of a disposition to avow that p, Archer (2013) contends that, other than
beliefs, different kinds of psychological attitudes can also serve the explanatory need.
Further details will be mentioned in section 2.4.14

Nevertheless, we need to note that even if one obtains such an unwarranted
attitude(s) towards p because of a particular cognitive process, we cannot be sure that
one engages in a process of irrational cognition. Suppose you wonder whether p or
14

Some might wonder if a disposition to avow and psychological attitudes other than beliefs
could serve as the necessary attitudes involved in self-deception, as their acquisitions or
maintenances do not seem to necessarily depend on the occurrence of the self-deceiving
process. I will talk about this issue in section 2.4.1 and section 2.4.2.
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not-p, and an expert tells you “p.” Since you think the expert should be reliable, you
come to believe that p. Unfortunately, the expert is wrong, and thus, you caused
yourself to believe a false proposition. However, you did not mean to mislead yourself,
as your false belief that p is properly grounded in the evidence you possess. As such,
you did not engage in a certain kind of irrationality – you merely made a mistake. As
with the previous two elements, although the “unwarranted-attitude-element” should be
treated as one that plays a decisive role in the constitution of the irrationality of
self-deception, this element on its own is not enough to address the irrational issue.

1.3 Bringing about the distinction problem
As mentioned in the introduction, despite the importance of investigating the
difference(s) between self-deception and other kinds of irrationality, herein termed the

distinction problem, this issue has mostly been left out of the literature.15 Now, with
the “vague consensus” on the initial definition of self-deception in mind, we can
consider whether it is enough to draw the boundary of “self-deception” by referring to
such an interpretation only. To this end, it is imperative to ensure any theory or case
that fits the requirements posed by the “vague consensus” would not lead us to mistake
another phenomenon for self-deception. However, the worry is that sometimes it might
not be that easy to rule out some cases that are (pre-theoretically or theoretically)
considered to be examples of other kinds of irrationality (especially those of wishful
thinking) by merely referring to the “vague consensus.”

15

Philosophers often try to dismiss hostile views by judging whether they miss the target
phenomenon. The same thing also happens in the literature of self-deception. But theorists
usually tend not to treat the distinction problem as an independent issue.
32

To illustrate the idea, let us first consider the case of “Beth” once more. Recall
that Beth comes to believe that she was her father‘s favorite child (p) because of a
certain desire, although the evidence she possesses should suggest otherwise (not-p).
Since the case of “Beth” meets all of the criteria posed by the “vague consensus,” it can
be concluded that Beth has probably deceived herself.

Similar cases can be found in various philosophical debates. One of these is the
case of “one-sided love” suggested by Szabados (1973):

Suppose that a young man is passionately in love with Miss X. He,
naturally enough, yearns to be loved in return. She smiles at him on
occasion, chats about the topics in the course they both attend and even
invites him (among many others) to tea and cookies. He jumps to the
conclusion that his love for her is being reciprocated. In spite of moments
of gloom involving thoughts of unrequited love, he is, he tells his friend,
convinced that she loves him too. (p. 203)

The young man is motivated by his desire and comes to a far-fetched conclusion that
Miss X loves him (p) while impartial observers should find that Miss X just treats him
the same way as she treats others. Has this young man “deceived” himself? This
question cannot be easily answered. We can tell that the young man is motivated to
engage in an irrational cognition, and hence, acquires the unwarranted belief that p
despite a lack of supporting evidence. Admittedly, since the available evidence does
not suggest that Miss X hates the young man, we do not have to admit that the young
man possesses conclusive evidence for concluding that not-p. Nevertheless, there is no
reason to think that the access-to-information-element necessarily entails such a strict
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requirement on the nature of the available evidence.16 Thus, the only explicit difference
between Beth and the young man is that Beth’s unpleasant feelings show signs that she
is likely to be aware that the evidence she has probably provides greater warrant for
not-p than for p.17 Then again, the “vague consensus” does not require that
self-deceived subjects must somehow be aware of such a situation. Based on the
criteria posed by the “vague consensus,” this case, like “Beth,” could also be
considered as an example of self-deception in some sense. In reality, though, Szabados
(1973) categorizes the case of “one-sided love” as an instance of wishful thinking. This
prompts us to ponder whether the “vague consensus” needs to be further refined.

Here we shall briefly look at what the definition of wishful thinking is in order
to set the tone for this study. As opposed to self-deception, defining wishful thinking is
a much less controversial issue in philosophical debates, since most philosophers
accept that we could explain it by referring to its psychological definition. In
psychology, wishful thinking is to form a belief in accordance with what one desires or
wishes to be true instead of the evidence (Bastardi, Uhlmann, & Ross, 2011, p. 731;
VandenBos & American Psychological Association, 2015, p. 1159). Accordingly,
philosophers usually take wishful thinking to be a kind of motivated irrationality in

16

Although the available evidence is typically supposed to provide greater warrant for not-p
than for p in self-deception, we do not have to require that it has to be conclusive. Given that
sometimes it is hard to decide whether the evidence is just ambiguous in certain cases, it is
difficult to distinguish whether a given case should count as self-deception by looking at what
evidence the involved subject possesses. I believe that the available evidence in the case of
“Beth” could also be considered as ambiguous in some sense. Admittedly, we tend to say the
evidence possessed by Beth is probably not that ambiguous, or she would not have such
unpleasant feelings while appraising it.
17 The young man may sometimes be worried whether his love is unrequited. Yet, there is no
sign that such feelings are causally related to the evidence he possesses. Since it is quite natural
for people to have such feelings when they care about the issue at hand, this needs not be
evidence that the young man is aware of any definite contrary evidence.
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which an involved subject acquires a belief that p because of a desire or wish that p.
For instance, Davidson (2004b) writes:

A minimal account of wishful thinking makes it a case of believing
something because one wishes it were true. [...] [W]ishful thinking is often
irrational, for example if we know why we have the belief and that we
would not have it if it were not for the wish. (p. 205)

Undoubtedly, some might try to argue that the case of “one-sided love” does
not look like an example of self-deception. Yet, I believe most of us would agree that
the definition of wishful thinking can be compatible with the “vague consensus” on the
initial idea of “self-deception” – this is exactly the reason why theorists often compare
self-deception with wishful thinking while analyzing self-deception. In view of such
compatibility, some theorists doubt that the phenomenon behind “wishful thinking”
could be identical to the one behind “self-deception.” But many theorists still contend
that, despite several crucial commonalities between the two, self-deception is a unique
phenomenon different from wishful thinking, or at most is a special branch of it
(Davidson, 2004b; Galeotti, 2012; Graham, 1986; Pedrini, 2012; Porcher, 2012;
Scott-Kakures, 2012; Szabados, 1973). Consequently, I find that at least three questions
are yet to be answered despite the “vague consensus” already being established:
➢ Should we insist that self-deception is different from wishful thinking?
➢ If the answer is yes, what is the difference(s) between self-deception and
wishful thinking?
➢ Is it enough to study the distinction problem by merely focusing on the
comparison between self-deception and wishful thinking?
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In this sense, it follows that a further discussion on the initial definition of
self-deception is needed if we were to completely resolve the distinction problem.

In the following discussion, I will assume that there is a distinctive feature(s)
which makes self-deception independent of other kinds of motivated irrationality,
especially wishful thinking, and then investigate whether this assumption would lead to
absurdity or contradiction. As mentioned earlier, most theorists tend to directly work
on a detailed analysis of self-deception without characterizing its distinctive feature(s),
yet many proposals for how to further specify the definition of self-deception can still
be found in the current discussion (although most of they are not aimed at solving the
distinction problem initially).

Before we start examining the proposals, concise clarification of the study of
the distinction problem will be useful. First, some might argue that the mentioned
assumption could be problematic because it might eventually force us to jump to a
conclusion that there must be strict boundaries between self-deception and other nearby
phenomena without giving a solid justification. However, having an assumption does
not necessarily mean we are trying to prove that it is true. Rather, the plan here is to
determine whether the conclusion reached from the assumption would contradict the
assumption itself.

Second, there might also be a concern about setting an unnecessary
restriction(s) on the diversity of “self-deception” by specifying the distinctive
feature(s) of it. Many philosophers emphasize that self-deception comes in so many
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varieties that they need to be divided into at least two main types: “straight” and
“twisted” (Funkhouser, 2005, p. 397; Galeotti, 2016, p. 91; Mele, 2001, p. 4; Nelkin,
2002, p. 393). Funkhouser (2005) even proposes that there should be at least one more
type of self-deception, namely, “indifferent self-deception” or “apathetic
self-deception” (p. 298). Nevertheless, recall that the distinction problem is crucial for
philosophers who are interested in self-deception, and this problem can not be solved
without further restricting the scope of “self-deception.” In this sense, what we need to
worry about is not whether the specification of the distinctive feature(s) of
self-deception is necessary, but how not to include unnecessary things in this
specification. A method to achieve this would be to ensure enough generality to
capture the diversity of self-deception with this principle: the study of the distinction
problem must not be limited to any particular type or isolated case of “self-deception.”
18

Hence in the discussion that follows, I will not exclude any alleged case of

self-deception that meets the requirements suggested by the “vague consensus,” unless
there is a good reason for doing so.

18

Quite a few philosophers only focus on a particular set of alleged “paradigm” cases while
studying “self-deception.” For example, Archer (2013) suggests:
[T]here is so much disparity in cases of self-deception that a unified account of
the phenomenon may be difficult to provide. Does this mean that we are forced to
admit that we can only pass comment on a case-by-case basis? I do not think it
does. Rather, my strategy will be to isolate ‘paradigm’ cases of the phenomenon
and limit my response to the doxastic problem to range over only these cases.
(p.269)
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CHAPTER II - EXAMINING RECENT SOLUTIONS TO THE DISTINCTION
PROBLEM
2.1 The current solutions to the distinction problem
The essential task of the investigation into self-deception is nothing else than
establishing its boundary. As mentioned previously, there are significant commonalities
shared by the large majority of views on self-deception, and thus a hypothesis for the
initial definition of “self-deception” exists, namely the “vague consensus.” If we accept
this initial definition of self-deception as the starting point for our study, our next step
will be to decide whether it can accomplish the essential task. By comparing alleged
cases of self-deception and alleged cases of wishful thinking, we can see that the
“vague consensus” might fail to provide an obvious reason why we should separate
“self-deception” from “wishful thinking.” Therefore, if we want to consider
self-deception to be a unique kind of irrationality, the distinction problem could
re-emerge. To be precise, the worry is that the “vague consensus” alone might not be
enough for ensuring that any theory or case that fits the requirements posed by it would
not lead us to mistake another phenomenon for self-deception. Could it be that the
worry is merely superfluous? Whether the answer is “yes” or “no,” lines of
argumentation or justifications are needed for dispelling the concern.

As we have seen in section 1.2, apart from being a real phenomenon, the
phenomenon of self-deception is assumed to consist of three elements, which together
reveal the irrational nature of it. If this hypothesis fails to specify what makes the
phenomenon of self-deception different from other nearby phenomena, and hence,
cannot serve as a satisfactory solution to the distinction problem, we will have to revise
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the hypothesis. There are two options for doing this: either imposing a further
restriction(s) on the three elements or proposing that the framework should contain a
fourth (or even more) element. The main focus of the following examination will be on
the first option, as the current discussion tends to concern it, but I will also discuss the
second option in section 2.5.

As mentioned before, most current works on self-deception focus on working
out a detailed account of it, that is, to directly describe the exact content of different
elements involved in the phenomenon, without locating the distinctive feature(s) of
self-deception. But, even so, the diverse views in the literature still (coincidentally)
provide us with a myriad of choices on how to further limit the scope of the application
of “self-deception.” In the upcoming sections, I am going to examine different
solutions mentioned in the literature in five major categories:

○ Motivation
○ Access to information
○ An unwarranted attitude(s)
○ Options outside the framework
○ The combination of access to information and an unwarranted attitude

The discussion will be conducted with the assumption that there is at least one
distinctive feature that can mark the dividing line between self-deception and other
types of motivated irrationality, especially wishful thinking. In case a solution suggests
a feature also possessed by another phenomenon similar to self-deception, I shall
consider it to be a failure. The aim here is to heuristically provide a promising direction
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for solving the distinction problem, and shed light on how to construct the basic model
of self-deception.

2.2 Motivation
There are at least three representative ways of characterizing the content of the
operative motivational state involved in the phenomenon of self-deception:19

(A) A desire that p (Galeotti, 2016; Mele, 2001, 2012)
(B) An intention to deceive oneself that p (Bermúdez, 2000; Davidson, 2004;
Sorensen, 1985)
(C) A desire to believe that p (Archer, 2013; Funkhouser, 2005; Nelkin, 2002)

Based on the lexical formula of self-deception generated from the idea of interpersonal
deception, intentionalists, such as Davidson (2004b), argue that the motivation that
primarily causes the phenomenon of self-deception should be an intention to deceive
oneself that p (where “p” stands for a particular unwarranted proposition that the
self-deception is about). On the other hand, non-intentionalists, who refuse to accept
the intentional picture, propose that a certain kind of desire would be sufficient for
playing the role. On non-intentionalists’ view, there are two candidates for this
operative desire: some non-intentionalists, like Mele (2001, 2012), take the
world-focused approach and think that the involved motivation is a desire that p, while

19

We should note that none of these proposals implies that emotions must not have a role in
the phenomenon of self-deception. Some theorists, like Galeotti (2016), argue that
self-deception probably starts with a motivation that is emotionally overloaded (by fear and
anxiety). In other words, emotions work as a “switch on button” for activating a subjective
reason to function as the operative motivation involved in self-deception. Also, Mele (2003)
contends that emotions can sometimes be causes of the motivation of self-deception, and
hence, affect the hypothesis targeted by it.
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others, like Archer (2013), follow the self-focused approach and suggest that it should
be a desire to believe that p.

To determine whether any of these proposals could help us to draw the
boundary between self-deception and wishful thinking, we will need to study the
operative motivational state of wishful thinking. As mentioned in section 1.3, it is
generally accepted that in a case of wishful thinking, a wishful thinker forms a belief
that p because of her desire that p. In this sense, proposal (A) shall be marked as failed.
The two remaining proposals will be investigated in the following sections.

2.2.1 An intention to deceive oneself that p
Intentionalists, like Davidson (2004b), accept the idea that self-deception could
count as a kind of wishful thinking due to the many common aspects. However, since
wishful thinking does not require any intentional intervention by the involved subject,
self-deception is at most a special branch of it (Davidson, 2004b, p. 207). It should be
noted that simply doing things intentionally with the result that one is deceived is
different from intentionally making oneself be deceived, because the former should be
characterized as merely making a mistake. As Davidson (2004b) writes:

[S]elf-deception requires the agent to do something with the aim of
changing his own views […] it is not self-deception simply to do something
intentionally with the consequence that one is deceived, for then a person
would be self-deceived if he read and believed a false report in a
newspaper. The self-deceiver must intend the ‘deception’. (p.207)

41

Accordingly, the idea is that in cases of self-deception, the involved subjects are
required to intend the “self-deceitful” project that causes the acquisition of the
necessary attitude(s). Therefore, for intentionalists, the motivation involved in
self-deception should be an intention to deceive oneself that p.

The intentional proposal seems to be very attractive. The problem, though, is
that it is grounded in the interpersonal model, which leads to the two famous paradoxes
identified by Mele (2001), namely, the static paradox and the dynamic paradox. The
static paradox is produced because the model appears to introduce an impossible state
of mind by suggesting that the involved subject should hold contradictory beliefs at the
same time (Mele, 2001, p. 6-7). The dynamic paradox is also generated because the
subject must be both aware and unaware of the “self-deceitful” project for being the
executor of the plan and also the victim of it, which also seems like an unachievable
state of mind (Mele, 2001, p. 8). The bigger obstacle for accepting the proposal is the
dynamic paradox since it is directly related to the motivational issue.

Intentionalists typically try to avoid the paradoxes by “partitioning” in different
senses. Some, such as Bermúdez (2000) and Sorensen (1985), claim that a single agent
can be separated into different temporal divisions, while others, such as Davidson
(2004b) and Rorty (1988), argue in favor of the idea of psychological parts in the mind.
Although the two options look different, both of them express the same underlying
idea, that is, these divisions or parts allow one to play the role of the deceiver and the
deceived separately.
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Those who adopt the strategy of “temporal partitioning” admit that it is not
possible to be concurrently the executor and the victim of a self-deceitful plan. But this
does not imply that self-deception is impossible when it is usually extended over time.
Sorensen (1985) points out that many of our daily activities are “scattered events,”
such as cooking, eating, and writing an essay, and hence, there is no surprise that
self-deception may happen in stages over a long period of time (p. 67). Bermúdez
(2000) also claims that the acquisition of a belief is usually a long-term process and “it
seems likely that the further on one is in the process, [...] the more likely one will be to
have lost touch with the original motivation” (p. 314). Hence when a subject intends to
bring it about that she obtains a belief that she knows to be false, she can take
advantage of this feature of belief formation. We might consider the case of “rich life”
suggested by Scott-Kakures (2012) as a demonstration:

Sammy [...] has no real friends, no lovers, no hobbies or other avocations.
Sammy knows that colleagues and acquaintances derive great satisfaction
from these things. [...] Sammy’s family has a depressingly systematic
history of early on-set Alzheimer’s disease. [...] He now embarks upon a
complex strategy designed to bring it about that he come, later in life, to
believe that he has led a life rich in human connections. He fills many
notebooks detailing imagined friendships, loveaffairs and travels. He offers
a bounty to those he engages via social media who send photographs,
postcards, and letters, and other memorabilia detailing imagined intimacies
with him. He secures the services of a trustee who will make certain that the
relevant materials are delivered when likely to prove effective. There’s no
real barrier to our imagining that this strategy could succeed in the way
Sammy foresees. We can imagine that, many years later, as he sits in bed at
an Alzheimer’s center, he’s asked by an inquisitive volunteer if he has many
friends or has traveled to exotic places. [...] Seeing the many boxes marked
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“friends” and “travels,” [...] He is delighted to discover that, as he now
comes to believe, he has led a life that touched (and was touched by) so
many others. (p. 21-22)

A subject may intentionally create evidence in favor of the unwarranted proposition
that p at T1. When the subject later forgets her self-deceitful intention as well as the
original belief that not-p at T2 and tries to figure out whether p or not-p by looking at
the available evidence (which has already been manipulated), she will then come to
acquire a false belief that p.

The psychological strategy has already been covered in section 1.1.1 and 1.2.1,
but a brief recapitulation of this strategy might be useful. Intentionalists who adopt this
strategy think that self-deception should be a case of irrationality in which a part of the
“self” tries to deceive another part of the “self.” Some proponents of this idea, such as
Rorty (1988), take a strong position and assume that there are autonomous
sub-agencies that can have beliefs, desires, and intentions. There is also a relatively
modest version suggested by Davidson (2004b), which proposes that there can be
boundaries between different parts of the mind. Both versions point to the possibility
that a single agent can be divided into plural sub-agents.

Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that all these strategies are feasible. As
Galeotti (2012) concludes, intentionalists try to induce indirectness or opacity in the
phenomenon of self-deception, that is to say, they try to solve the paradoxes brought by
the intentional model of self-deception by undermining its intentional feature.
However, as Scott-Kakures (2012) argues:
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If success hinges upon intentionally causing myself to deceive myself
unintentionally, it is not at all easy to see what these other mechanisms and
processes could be if not the non-intentional motivational and affective
mechanisms described by deflationists. (p. 31)

If the success of self-deception depends on whether one can intentionally make oneself
self-deceive unintentionally, it seems that we should reject the intentional model
completely and take the non-intentional approach. After all, there are intentionalists,
like Davidson (2004b), who think that “a desire to believe that p” is typically present in
the phenomenon of self-deception (p. 207). Bermúdez (2000) also seconds this idea
and acknowledges:

The wishful thinker acquires that belief that p because they want it to be the
case that p. The self-deceiver, in contrast, will usually want it to be the case
that p – but will also want it to be the case that they believe that p. (p. 312)
20

Admittedly, both Bermúdez(2000) and Davidson (2004b) do not agree that a
desire to believe that p can activate the formation of the necessary attitude(s) without
being mediated by an intention to deceive oneself that p. Nevertheless, if intentionalists
have to appeal to a specific feature that would eventually be undermined anyway, it
will not make sense to make such a move in the first place. It seems that the intentional
proposal eventually leads us to consider the desire-to-believe proposal, which will be
discussed in the next section.

20

I do not intend to argue that the difference between self-deception and wishful thinking lies
in the motivational issue. I merely try to show that the intentionalist picture of self-deception
could accommodate the desire-to-believe proposal.
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2.2.2 A desire to believe that p
Some theorists, such as Funkhouser (2005), contend that by taking the
self-focused approach in dealing with the motivational issue of self-deception, we can
offer a unified explanation of how the different varieties of self-deception are
prompted. As I have mentioned in section 1.3, many theorists suggest that the
phenomenon often occurs in two forms, which can be called “straight” and “twisted”
(Funkhouser, 2005, p. 397; Galeotti, 2016, p. 91; Mele, 2001, p. 4; Nelkin, 2002, p.
393). Straight cases are those that we are familiar with – the case of “Beth” is a
standard example of this type, in which Beth comes to believe the desirable (albeit
unwarranted) proposition that “I was my father‘s favorite child” (p). On the contrary,
according to Mele (2001), “people are self-deceived in believing something that they
want to be false (and do not also want to be true)” in twisted cases (p. 4). This means
that the involved subjects acquire the unwarranted belief that p (or the like) although
the state of affairs corresponding with p is supposed to be undesirable to them. As an
example of twisted self-deception, consider the case of “Joey” conceived by
Funkhouser (2005):

Joey is a jealous man. Objective observers are convinced that it is highly
unlikely that his wife Marcia is having an affair. But Joey says otherwise,
often calling her names that shock his friends. They tell him that he has no
reason to think that she’s sneaking off to see another guy whenever she
visits with her female friends. They say that her recently increased sex drive
is probably not an act to cover her guilt. But Joey violently protests.
Unsurprisingly, Joey does not like to be proven wrong and refrains from
calling Marcia’s friends to confirm her stories. (p. 297)
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Although a world-focused desire can successfully play a role in motivating
straight cases, it looks like it cannot explain why one engages in twisted cases.
Nonetheless, Funkhouser (2005) argues that there is still commonality to both straight
and twisted cases with regard to the motivational issue. In particular, Funkhouser
(2005) points out that self-deceived subjects in different types of cases usually engage
in avoidance behavior, which looks to suggest that they desire to believe that p
regardless of the truth-value of p.21 In this sense, to provide a unified account of
motivation, we would be required to acknowledge that the operative motivational state
of self-deception is a desire to believe that p.

Additionally, Funkhouser (2005) notes that the desire-to-believe proposal
implies a third type of self-deception, namely, “indifferent” or “apathetic
self-deception,” in which there is no way for a world-focused motivation to take a role
(p. 298). As Funkhouser (2005) explains:

One example is self-deception prompted by peer pressure. We often have
desires (more generally: motivations) to be like those around us. Common
examples include desires to dress and talk like our peers. Sometimes we
even have desires to believe as those around us believe. Just as it can be
awkward to be the oddball in dress or speech, it is sometimes awkward to
hold a minority belief. And one could be motivated to self-deception by
having a desire to believe what one’s peers believe, while being indifferent

21

According to Funkhouser (2005), avoidance behavior is “the sophisticated behavior of
avoiding evidence that not-p in a way that shows the agent already possesses sufficient
information that not-p” (note. 5). The performance of this behavior is typically aimed at
maintaining the necessary attitude involved in the phenomenon.
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to the truth or falsity of what is believed. The belief is simply desired for its
utility. (p. 298-299)

However, there is a reason to reject the very motivation for suggesting such a
self-focused desire. Making reference to cases of psychiatric delusion (which is
undoubtedly a kind of unmotivated phenomenon) found in Volume IV of the American
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM-IV), Mele (2007) argues that at least some alleged twisted cases “are best
explained not by the kind of biasing characteristic of self-deception, but instead by the
presence of cognitive deficits” (p. 164).22 Moreover, the case of “Joey” and cases
similar to it are consistent with the description of the “jealous type of delusional
disorder” that is recorded in DSM-IV, which implies that psychologists probably agree
that such cases should be classified as one type of delusion (Mele, 2007, p. 171).
Numerous studies also show that of those who seem to be affected by such a kind of
jealousy, almost all have another psychotic symptom(s) (Mele, 2007, p. 172-173). If at
least some standard examples of “twisted case” should probably count as a kind of
unmotivated phenomenon (namely mental disease) instead of a type of self-deception,
could it be that the idea of “twisted case” is redundant from the very beginning? If so,
the biggest motivation for adopting the desire-to-believe proposal is eliminated.

Yet, as mentioned in section 1.3, we should try not to exclude any alleged case
or type of self-deception so easily. Hence let us assume that twisted cases should be
included in the analysis of self-deception. Despite this assumption, the literature further

22

For patients who suffer from cognitive deficits, they have the experience that contains some
untruthful or abnormal ideas as part of its content and lose the ability to suspend this
experience (Kiran and Chaudhury, 2009; Mele, 2007).
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reveals two reasons why it is unnecessary to introduce the “desire-to-believe” to the
model of self-deception. First, as Galeotti (2016) argues, even if we admit that twisted
cases are examples of self-deception, we can perfectly explain why those necessary
attitudes involved are so different from those involved in straight cases without
rejecting the world-focused strategy. Galeotti (2016) contends that “self-deceivers
usually display confirmatory bias that is the mental habit to look for confirmation of
one’s hypothesis” in straight cases (p. 96). But in a twisted case, the involved subject
instead conjures up “worst-case scenarios” and is therefore very likely to be affected by
a special bias called “probability neglect” (Galeotti, 2016, p.97-98). Hence “without a
final disproof she will be caught by the false and adverse belief that [not-p]” (Ibid.). As
Galeotti (2016) writes:

In principle, worst-case scenarios are improbable events, representing only
one extreme of a whole range of possibilities, yet it seems that once the
scenario has been conjured up, the low probability is discounted, and the
subject’s fear and anxiety are reassured only by conclusive evidence
showing the scenario false. Thus while S [who engages in a straight case]
lowers the threshold of evidence to go on believing that [p], S¹ [who
engages in a twisted case] heightens the threshold of evidence required to
disbelieve [not-p]. The operative desire that [p] is matched by the resulting
self-deceptive belief that [not-p], though negatively, so as to be thematic,
thus satisfying a commonly acknowledged requirement for [self-deception].
(p. 97)

Second, Pedrini (2012) points out that it does not seem that a want for p being
true is just a contingent (that is, unnecessary) factor in cases of self-deception, since the
subjects in both straight and twisted cases are all so interested in establishing that the
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reality is the way they want. Pedrini (2012) emphasizes that one of the most significant
features of self-deception is that the involved subjects will “spend time and energy on
elaborating ‘covering stories’” to justify that p and “typically struggle epistemically
with evidence against p to arrive at an explanation of why it should not count as
undermining p” (p. 148-149). This epistemic work should show that the importance of
“believing that p” is based on the importance those subjects put on “knowing that p is
true” (Pedrini, 2012, p. 148-149). Moreover, avoidance behavior can be explained as
avoiding “contact with sources of evidence suggesting that the favored hypothesis that

p may be false” rather than being indifferent to what the reality is (Pedrini, 2012, p.
151). If Pedrini (2012) is correct, the primary motivation of self-deception should be a
world-focused one, since the acquisition or the maintenance of the necessary attitude(s)
is supported by the epistemic work motivated by a desire that p, and the self-focused
desire merely occurs as the by-product of this world-focused desire. With this idea in
mind, once we agree that an epistemic work may also be involved in “indifferent
self-deception” cases, cases of this type should not be considered to be “indifferent”
anymore.23

Apart from the ideas presented in the literature, it appears to me that the
desire-to-believe proposal is just another way of saying that “the operative motivation
is a desire that p.” We should note that “p” can be any unwarranted proposition that the
ongoing self-deception is about. While “I believe in a specific proposition” can also be

23

It seems that epistemic work must be presented in “indifferent self-deception” cases if we
insist that the involved subjects sincerely believe their peers’ opinions to be true. At least, for
example, when we question why they believe in their peers’ opinions on a certain matter, they
may answer “Well, my friends are smart, so their opinions should be correct. Two of them even
have a Ph.D. in the field related to this matter.”
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considered as the proposition that the self-deception is about, it seems reasonable to
say a subject involved in a twisted case does desire that p, where “p” represents the
proposition that “I believe in a specific proposition.” If this is the case, the difference
between the world-focused proposal and Funkhouser’s (2005) proposal is not clear.

At this point, the representative ways of specifying the precise content of the
motivation-element other than the world-focused strategy have seemingly failed. Are
there any other possible ways? Although I do not intend to solve the motivational
issue, here we can still briefly look at why the answer to this question is probably “no.”
Some philosophers, like Galeotti (2016) and Lynch (2013), contend that the content of
the necessary attitude(s) involved in self-deception should be linked to the content of
the motivation-element, that is, if the necessary attitude(s) has p (or not-p) in its
content, the involved motivation should also have p (or not-p) in its content. Otherwise,
the boundary between self-deception and certain types of motivated irrationality, such
as stubborn beliefs, will be broken (Galeotti, 2016, p. 93; Lynch, 2013).24 Therefore,
proposals other than these three would not be worth mentioning, and, considering the
analysis up till now, our best bet among the three would be a desire that p. However, as
mentioned earlier, the suggestion that the primary motivation involved in
self-deception is a desire that p will blur the boundary between self-deception and

24

As Lynch (2013) explains, for a person who stubbornly believes in something:
Such a person is one who, after having settled on some opinion, refuses to
reconsider it and sticks to that opinion, when other people are with good reason
encouraging him to reconsider, or when he is confronted with evidence which
would warrant such a reconsideration and perhaps rejection of that belief. The
stubborn believer won’t be talked out of his view, and is unyielding or resistant to
reasonable persuasion. He clings to the belief, as we say, stubbornly. (p. 1340)
51

wishful thinking. As a result, the distinction problem has to be solved by restricting the
other two elements.

2.3 Access to information
As discussed in section 1.2.4, while theorists unanimously assume that
self-deceived subjects should have access to evidence that provides greater warrant for
not-p than for p, they have different views on how this access should be represented.
The literature describes at least four ways to address this access:

(D) External access: one merely having the available data that can justify believing
that not-p without appraising it (Mele, 2001; Nelkin, 2002; Noordhof, 2009)
(E) A (full) belief that not-p (Audi, 1982; Davidson, 2004b; Funkhouser, 2005;
Sorensen, 1985)
(F) A belief that there is a significant chance that not-p (Mele, 2012)
(G) Psychological categories other than “belief,” such as a suspicion that not-p
(Archer, 2013; Galeotti, 2016)

Yet, we should be careful that the assumption just mentioned brings up the following
two problems: (i) whether the available evidence must be overall in favor of not-p and
(ii) whether the awareness of (namely conscious access to) such evidence is required in
the model of self-deception. These problems will be dealt with in the following section
before investigating those proposals, as they will affect how we should proceed with
the investigation.

2.3.1 Must a self-deceived subject be aware of the available evidence that is overall in
favor of not-p?
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As mentioned in section 1.2.4, it is obvious that intentionalists have to agree
with both (i) and (ii) because of the lexical picture adopted by them.25 Now it is worth
considering whether the empirical approach gives us any reason for making these
assumptions too. Most non-intentionalists simply take (i) for granted because ordinary
people usually use “self-deception” to refer to the cases in which there is great
resistance produced by the available evidence to the acquisitions or the maintenances
of the necessary attitudes (Archer, 2013, p. 266; Funkhouser, 2005, p. 296; Nelkin,
2002).26 In this sense, if the necessary attitude(s) involved in self-deception is assumed
to be an attitude towards p that can explain why one acts as if p (such as telling others
that p is true), the available evidence should give greater warrant for not-p than for p.

Other theorists, such as Galeotti (2012, 2016), who also take the empirical
approach, further argue that the available data should provide greater warrant for not-p
because it is the reason why a self-deceived subject has to set off self-deceitful
strategies at the very beginning.27 Undoubtedly, some may insist that, even if the
evidence is just ambiguous, an agent who is motivated to (at least verbally) endorse p
may also be driven to search for reasons for considering p as true with the help of
welcoming yet trivial pieces of evidence. However, this is seemingly not what is

25

Recall section 1.1.1 and section 1.2.2 in which I mentioned that intentionalists assume that
self-deceived subjects already possess sufficient evidence for concluding that not-p because of
the lexical picture they adopted.
26 Recall those non-intentionalist views introduced in the previous sections. Although not all
non-intentionalists suggest self-deceived subjects must somehow be aware that p is objectively
false, they unitedly admit that there should be sufficient evidence for the subjects to conclude
that not-p is more likely to be true. This situation will undoubtedly cause resistance to the
acquisition or the maintenance of any propositional attitude that can lead to the (verbal)
endorsement of p from the possessor, given that this situation should lead to the (verbal)
endorsement of not-p from a rational agent.
27 Note that Galeotti (2012, 2016) is a supporter of the mixed strategy, which consists of both
intentionalism and non-intentionalism.
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happening in the (alleged) examples of self-deception. Apart from giving more weight
to the welcoming yet trivial pieces of evidence, different types of biased cognition and
odd behaviors (such as avoidance behavior) play roles in affecting the process of
judging the truth in the non-intentionalist model of self-deception (which can be
referred to as self-deceitful strategies for promoting the necessary attitude(s)) (Lynch,
2017; Mele, 2001, 2012; Pedrini, 2012; Porcher, 2012).28 As Porcher (2012) explains:

Suppose I have a desire that this paper be accepted for publication. Would
this suffice for me to avoid evidence that it won’t? No. In order for that to
happen, I would need a desire that this paper be accepted, coupled with a
cognitive representation (let’s leave it at that for the time being) that it
won’t or at least might not be accepted. (p. 72)

Admittedly, if the available evidence is not threatening in the eyes of the involved
subjects, why should they be motivated to engage in such onerous work?29

Regarding (ii), I mentioned in section 1.2.4 that some theorists deny the need
for encoding the access-to-information-element in one’s mind in terms of conscious
propositional attitudes and hence no conscious access at all. Recall Mele's (2001, 2012)
(original) deflationary account which suggests that the fourth condition for entering
self-deception is to possess evidence that can justify believing that not-p. Given that
Mele’s (original) account does not further require self-deceived subjects to appraise the
natural implication(s) of such evidence, the access-to-information-element is nothing
28

See Mele (2012) for a detailed illustration of how biasing cognition sheds light on this issue.
In addition, for intentionalists, self-deceitful strategies may include various ways of intentional
manipulation of the evidence (Bermúdez, 2000; Sorensen, 1985).
29 But note that those strange behaviors (such as avoidance behavior) need not be a necessary
factor in self-deception.
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more than an existing method or opportunity of getting near to what the evidence
actually suggests. On the other hand, intentionalists, and a few non-intentionalists too
(such as Audi (1982) and Rorty (1988)), contend that even if an involved subject is
mentally affected by the natural implication(s) of evidence that overall warrants not-p,
this effect should be encoded as a propositional attitude(s) that she keeps hidden from
her awareness and puts into the unconscious mind.

Let us first consider whether self-deceived subjects should be responsive to the
natural implication of the available evidence while encountering it.30 It appears that
once we admit that self-deception is not an abnormal psychological phenomenon,
namely a mental disease, we have to acknowledge that those involved subjects must be
somehow affected by the power of the available evidence. As Lynch (2012) argues,
self-deception is something that is implemented by ordinary people, who should be
“generally sensitive to the force of good evidence” rather than fully insusceptible to it
(p. 442). Indeed, if one is entirely unresponsive to the natural implication(s) of the
available evidence, she should be considered as suffering from a certain kind of mental
dysfunction or mental illness, such as delusional disorder, instead of self-deceiving.
Furthermore, once we allow self-deceived subjects to be immune to the power of the
available evidence, we just set up an unfair situation, where the subjects are incapable
of being rational (in an evidentialist sense) from the very beginning and hence
inevitably being blamed for acting irrational.

30

If one can never encounter the available evidence for judging whether p, we must say one
does not have access to information about whether p or not-p. I argued in section 1.2.4 that the
access-to-information-element is a necessary constituent of self-deception and therefore we
have to admit that one’s encounter with the available evidence is expected to present, if not a
prerequisite for this phenomenon.
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On the problem of having conscious access, Galeotti (2012) argues that the
claim that the access-to-information-element is one of the necessary constituents of
self-deception already suggests that an involved subject is aware of the evidence:

If there is no such appraisal of the contrary data, as maintained by Mele,
that implies that the motivationally relevant counter-evidence is
automatically shut off S’s awareness and stored in some non-conscious
mind module; but then, the relevant evidence is not available to S --contrary
to what is stated in [the fourth condition]; and, in the absence of contrary
evidence, her belief-formation pattern works correctly even if it ends up
falsely believing that [p]. (p. 49)

Surely, if one’s awareness can be automatically/unconsciously shut off while
encountering unwelcoming pieces of evidence, the body of data “available” to her
should be in favor of p. Hence it is not irrational for her to consciously endorse that p.
(In addition, we should doubt whether she is a psychologically healthy person.) On the
other hand, if the subject can selectively shut off her awareness towards unwelcoming
pieces of evidence, she still needs to first have a conscious appreciation (no matter how
it is encoded in her mind) of the contrary evidence. In fact, Mele (2012) acknowledges
that “S consciously believes at the time that there is a significant chance that not-p” can
also count as one of the jointly sufficient conditions for entering the phenomenon,
suggesting he agrees that self-deceived subjects (consciously) appraise the available
evidence they have (and hence form a corresponding belief based on its natural
implication(s)) (p. 12).
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Given the points mentioned above, I think it is fair to assume that the available
evidence in cases of self-deception should sufficiently warrant a belief that not-p or the
like, and self-deceived subjects should have conscious access to such information. It is
clear now that there is a need to refine the primary restriction on the
“access-to-information-element” (which was mentioned in section 1.2.4). This element
used to refer to “access to evidence that provides greater warrant for not-p than for p,”
but I will consider it as “conscious access to (or an awareness of) evidence that overall
warrants not-p” in the remainder of this thesis, which means that self-deceived subjects
must more or less appraise the natural implication(s) of such evidence.

2.3.2 Wishful thinking vs. Self-deception
It is noteworthy that some theorists believe we can easily distinguish
self-deception from wishful thinking if self-deceived subjects must be aware of the
evidence that is overall in favor of not-p (Galeotti, 2012; Graham, 1986; Pedrini, 2012;
Szabados, 1973). To start with, we may first discuss whether there is any theoretical or
empirical reason to insist that the evidence available to wishful thinkers must be in
favor of not-p. Recall the discussion on the psychological and philosophical definition
of wishful thinking in section 1.3. We should note that even though the primary reason
for a wishful thinker to insist that p is true is a wish/desire that p, this does not entail
that the evidence she has conscious access to must be against p.31 Certainly, this idea
alone does not necessarily suggest that the evidence possessed by a wishful thinker
must not be against p. Nevertheless, many theorists point out that in (alleged) cases of

31

In contrast, in (alleged) cases of self-deception, impartial observers should find a belief that
p unconvincing because the evidence that the involved subjects have conscious access to
suggests otherwise (Galeotti, 2012; Lynch, 2017; Pedrini, 2012; Szabados, 1973).
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wishful thinking, whenever the involved subjects are aware of the contrary evidence,
they would acknowledge it as the valid justification for not-p and simultaneously stop
their wishful thinking, rather than “pervert the procedures whereby we establish truth
and falsehood” (Szabados, 1973, p. 205; see also Galeotti, 2012, p. 49-50; Graham,
1986, p. 224; Pedrini, 2012).

With this in mind, let us reconsider the case of “one-sided love.” Szabados
(1973) suggests that we might be unsure whether to count this case as an example of
wishful thinking or that of self-deception because we have no obvious reason to insist
that the young man possesses and is aware of any definite contrary evidence. And,
when we suspect that he is actually aware of such evidence, it turns out that we prefer
to consider him as self-deceiving (Szabados, 1973, p. 204). As Szabados (1973)
illustrates:

Consider now the following additions and changes to this story. Suppose his
friend, sympathetic but tough-minded, says when he hears this [situation of
the young man] ‘Ah, that is wishful thinking’. Suppose he continues by
pointing out that the said young lady keeps frequent company with Z and
they have been observed to be quite intimate. Our man is quite unshaken
and tells the friend that surely this is mere friendship between Z and Miss
X. They have probably been brought up together and are fond of each other.
Furthermore, the said ‘intimacies’ were noted at parties where Miss X tends
to be quite outgoing. In any case, they do not really bear upon their
relationship. He persists in his belief, yet we detect signs of worry in his
conduct and the occasional give-away in his conversation; sometimes he is
on the verge of coming to terms with the mounting evidence but then,
through an effort of will, he continues to explain it away and reassure
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himself. This [...] is a case which is properly called ‘self-deception’ and not
simply wishful thinking. (p. 204)

Accordingly, we can distinguish whether a given case should count as self-deception or
wishful thinking by considering if we can attribute an awareness of evidence that
overall supports not-p to the involved subject. It looks like the distinction problem has
been solved. However, I will show that there is more to the issue than that in section
2.3.4. But beforehand, I would like first to discuss how we can encode this conscious
access in one’s mind.

2.3.3 How should this conscious access be encoded?
To account for the access-to-information-element, a cognitive attitude(s)
towards not-p must be attributed to the involved subject. Then what kind of cognitive
attitude should it be? On the one hand, some theorists, like Porcher (2012), propose
that conscious access, namely an awareness, should probably be encoded as a doxastic
attitude (p. 73). On the other hand, some, such as Archer (2013) and Galeotti (2016),
contend that certain types of affective attitudes can play the role successfully. Yet, no
matter which option is to be adopted, we can see proposal (D) should be rejected.
Incidentally, proposal (E) and proposal (F) can be classified as the doxastic approach
while proposal (G) should be categorized as the affective approach.32 Since most of us
are quite familiar with the idea of “full belief,” I am going to focus on clarifying
proposals (F) and (G).

32

Even though some proponents of proposal (E), such as Audi (1982), deny that self-deceived
subjects have any conscious attitude towards not-p, I will consider the suggested “full belief”
as a conscious belief, given what I have mentioned in section 2.3.1.
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Mele (2012), the leading proponent of proposal (F), suggests that even if the
access-to-information-element is involved in a real case of self-deception, we only
have to admit that the involved subject holds a belief that “there is a significant chance
that [not-p]” rather than a full belief that not-p (p. 12). As Chan and Rowbottom (2019)
illustrate, this suggestion can be understood in two different ways (p. 1206-1207). The
first option is to interpret this doxastic attitude as a degree of belief that not-p (D(~p)).
This degree of belief must be over a certain threshold that makes it count as believing
that not-p, since it is required to reveal some appraisal of the natural implication(s) of
the available evidence, which overall warrants not-p. I assume that the threshold is 0.5
here. Hence D(~p) is restricted to be over 0.5.33 The second option is to interpret this
as a full belief that “‘The probability of not-p is greater than n,’ where n is an
appropriate threshold” (Chan and Rowbottom, 2019, p. 1207). However, there is a
strong reason not to choose the second option. As Chan and Rowbottom (2019) note:

In order to have a belief with the content “The probability of not-p is
greater than n” (or some appropriate surrogate), a subject must grasp the
concept of probability. (A subject would also have to grasp the more
specific concept of world-based or aleatory probability in order to have a
belief concerning a chance, and so forth.) However, it is reasonable to think
that self-deception occurred before probability, in anything akin to the
modern sense, had been conceived of. It is also plausible that children (and
others in the modern world) who haven’t grasped the concept of probability
are capable of self-deception. (p. 1207)

33

Degrees of belief held by a generally rational agent must obey the probability calculus,
which suggests that D(p) + D(~p) is always equal to 1 (Eriksson and Hájek, 2007).
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Thus, it should be clear that proposal (F) should suggest the presence of a degree of
belief that not-p, which is over 0.5 (D(~p) > 0.5).

In contrast, other theorists, such as Archer (2013) and Galeotti (2016), suggest
that we should account for the access-to-information-element by the attribution of a
suspicion that not-p, combined with other kinds of emotion relevant to not-p (for
example, anxiety that not-p or fear that not-p). However, Archer (2013) notes that “one
may insist that a suspicion that p simply is or entails a low degree of belief that p”
since it might just be an attitude that falls short of being a full belief in a particular
proposition (p. 272). Even though Archer (2013) does not endorse this idea, she admits
that:

[W]e ought to accept that a suspicion that p involves (although it cannot be
reduced to), at least, something like the belief ‘It may be the case that p,’ or
perhaps even in some cases, ‘It is likely that p’. (p. 273)
So, on Archer’s (2013) view, a suspicion that not-p entails many beliefs with not-p in
their content, such as a full belief that q, where q refers to “It is likely that not-p” or a
full belief that n, where n refers to “not-p is more possible than p” (while the ongoing
self-deception is with respect to p).

We should notice that Archer (2013) still affirms that the attribution of the two
main beliefs, namely the belief that p and the belief that not-p, can be excluded entirely
in the model of self-deception despite the need of attributing different beliefs with
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not-p in their content to the involved subject. But just as in the discussion of proposal
(F), Chan and Rowbottom (2019) point out that:

For [a self-deceived subject] to have a belief like“It is possible that p” or “It
is likely that p” or “p is more possible than [not-p],” as Archer suggests she
must in order to suspect that p, the [self-deceived subject] must have a
conception of possibility (and that it may come in degrees) or of probability
(or some near surrogate). That is to say, provided it is impossible for one to
fully believe in a proposition without grasping that proposition in its
entirety. But it is possible for people who lack such concepts – such as
children – to be self-deceived. Thus requiring such beliefs is inappropriate.
Requiring that [a self-deceived subject] has a degree of belief (or degree of
confidence) in a proposition, on the other hand, doesn’t require that the
[self-deceived subject] has the concept ‘degree of belief,’ or even that the
[self-deceived subject] is aware of her own degrees of belief. (p. 1212)

As a result, we should interpret proposal (G) as the same as proposal (F), that is,
attribution of a certain degree of belief that not-p. Since this attitude should reveal that
one’s appraisal of the natural implication(s) of the available evidence that overall
warrants not-p, it should also be restricted to be over 0.5 too. Now, it should be clear
that when we account for the access-to-information-element, the attribution of doxastic
attitude concerning not-p is inevitably be introduced or involved even when we try
hard to avoid the doxastic approach – of course, we have two options at hand – we can
attribute either a full belief that not-p or a degree of belief that not-p, which is over 0.5,
to the self-deceived subject.

2.3.4 Willful ignorance vs. Self-deception
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It was shown in the previous discussion that, by attributing a full belief that
not-p or a degree of belief that not-p, which is over 0.5, to a self-deceived subject, we
can successfully distinguish between wishful thinking and self-deception. However,
this does not mean that we have already solved the distinction problem. Even though
the initial study of the distinction problem leads us to attach great significance to the
comparison between wishful thinking and self-deception, we should not assume that
wishful thinking is the only phenomenon which may easily be confused with
self-deception. The fact is that there is another kind of motivated irrationality that is
characterized by the attribution of a suspicion that not-p – the phenomenon of willful
ignorance (also called willful blindness) (Lynch, 2016). Thus, if we are going to work
out a thorough solution to the distinction problem, we have to decide whether there is a
difference(s) between willful ignorance and self-deception.

It is easy to determine whether willful ignorance should be considered as a kind
of self-deception since Lynch (2016) already provides a detailed discussion on this
issue. As Lynch (2016) indicates, the phenomenon of willful ignorance is a kind of
motivated irrationality in which the subject is motivated to keep herself unaware of the
evidence that would lead her to establish the truth of a (probably true) proposition that
not-p. “Burke” is a standard case of willful ignorance:

Consider Burke, who believes he is in good health, but who one day
develops some abnormal physical symptoms. He knows that these
symptoms can be caused by condition A, which is harmless, or by condition
B, a mostly fatal disease. So his having these symptoms would normally
justify a visit to the doctor, though condition B is incurable. Let’s also
suppose that these developments are not innocent at all. However, Burke
63

doesn’t go, because he’d rather not know that he has condition B if he does.
(Lynch, 2016, p. 506)

Although the case of “Burke” might look like an example of self-deception, it should
be classified as willful ignorance because it is associated with a limited range of
doxastic states, which is different from those involved in a real case of self-deception
(Lynch, 2016). As Lynch (2016) writes:

Willful ignorance and self-deception are associated with different ranges of
doxastic states. Willful ignorance involves suspecting that [not-p].
Self-deception can involve suspecting that [not-p] too, but it can also
involve believing that [p], unlike willful ignorance. (p. 552)34

But what does “suspecting” mean? Lynch (2016) contends that a suspicion that
not-p should not be considered as a (full) belief that not-p, even though he admits that a
suspicion that not-p is (or at least involves) a kind of belief similar to a (full) belief that
not-p might be true (p. 509). As we have seen in the discussion of proposal (G), such
an acknowledgment will eventually lead to the attribution of a degree of belief that
not-p to the involved subject. Moreover, given that the subjects involved in cases of
willful ignorance behave in a way suggesting that not-p is likely to be true (such as
avoiding contact with sources of evidence that can help them to figure out whether
not-p), this degree of belief seems to be over 0.5 as well. Consequently, if we suggest
that willful ignorance should not be a form of self-deception, we will have to discuss

34

Lynch (2016) also discusses whether the motivation-element can help us distinguish
between willful ignorance and self-deception in his paper. However, even though Lynch (2016)
does not consider a desire that p to be a necessary feature of willful ignorance, he agrees that it
is possible that the involved subject typically desires that p in paradigmatic willful ignorance
(p. 517). Therefore, Lynch (2016) decides not to distinguish the two phenomena on this point
(p. 517).
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further whether we should restrict the unwarranted-attitude-element of self-deception
in the way suggested by Lynch (2016).

Given Lynch’s (2016) argumentation and the previous discussion, it should be
evident that the distinction problem cannot be completely resolved without specifying
the access-to-information-element and the unwarranted-attitude-element together.
However, as we will see in section 2.6, many theorists have tried and failed to account
for this combination because they cannot solve the static paradox posed by their
proposals. Having said that, I will also show that even if we figure out how to address
this combination without causing the static paradox, it does not mean that our study
should end there. For the time being, though, I would offer a brief synopsis for the
discussion on how to specify the access-to-information-element: a certain kind of
doxastic attitude towards not-p must be introduced or involved while accounting for
this element, and this doxastic attitude must make one count as being aware of the
natural implication(s) of the available data, which provides greater warrant for not-p
than for p.

2.4 An unwarranted attitude(s)
As mentioned in section 1.2.5, theorists think that an unwarranted attitude(s)
concerning p is necessarily involved in the phenomenon of self-deception while the
acquisition or maintenance of this necessary attitude(s) is based on, or at least related
to, the self-deceiving process. There are at least five proposals from the literature for
further restricting the content of the necessary attitude(s) involved in self-deception:
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(H) An avowal of p, also termed an avowed belief that p (Audi, 1982; Rey, 1988)
(I) Psychological categories, such as a hope that p or a desire to believe that p
(Archer, 2013)
(J) A (full) belief that p (Bermúdez, 2000; Davidson, 2004b; Galeotti, 2016;
Lynch, 2017; Mele, 2001; Sorensen, 1985; Van Leeuwen, 2007)
(K) A (full) belief that believing that p (Funkhouser, 2005; Nelkin, 2002)
(L) The indeterminate approach (Funkhouser, 2009; Porcher, 2012; Schwitzgebel,
2010)35

Note that theorists usually agree that the necessary attitude(s) is inside one’s conscious
mind, or at least can be easily drawn into conscious awareness, although some of them
think that the possessor of this attitude might lack knowledge about its true colors.36 I
agree with this idea, given that one of the phenomenological features of self-deception
is the verbal behavior (both privately and publicly) which seems to suggest the
assumption that p (Archer, 2013, p. 277; Audi, 1982, p. 137; Funkhouser, 2005, p. 306;
Galeotti, 2012, p. 50; Rorty, 1988, p. 11; Szabados, 1973, p. 205; Van Leeuwen, 2007).
It is psychologically abnormal for one to consciously affirm a particular proposition,
namely not just a slip of the tongue, without consciously experiencing a corresponding
mental state that encourages one to do so.

Again, whether any of those proposals can solve the distinction problem will
(primarily) depend on what the necessary attitude(s) involved in wishful thinking is.

35

But I think proponents of proposal (L) would probably tend not to use the term “necessary
attitude(s)” in order to avoid misunderstanding, given that they do not view the idea of
“propositional attitude (particularly, beliefs)” in a usual way. I will replace “necessary
attitude(s)” with the word “product” (which is a term adopted by Funkhouser (2009)) when I
discuss the indeterminate approach. More details of this view will be presented in section 2.4.4.
36 Once again, since proponents of proposal (L) have new ideas on what a “propositional
attitude” is, it is hard to say whether they think that one can be “conscious” or “unconscious”
of a certain propositional attitude.
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We have already determined that the necessary attitude involved in wishful thinking is
a belief that p, but we need to be careful that this belief needs not be restricted as a full
one, as long as it can count as believing that p. Therefore, the positive attitude towards

p acquired by a wishful thinker can be a belief that p or a degree of belief that p, which
is over 0.5. Hence it is clear that proposal (J) should be disqualified.

2.4.1 An avowal of p, or an avowed belief that p
Both Audi (1982) and Rey (1988) argue for a behavioral approach to account
for the unwarranted-attitude-element, which suggests attributing an avowal of p, or an
avowed belief that p, to self-deceived subjects.37 I prefer the term “avowal” to avoid
misunderstanding, but we should be careful that we are now considering a particular
attitude towards p rather than only what an agent says. As Van Leeuwen (2007)
concludes, for both Audi and Rey, an avowal is a positive attitude towards p that makes
one have “a disposition to affirm a proposition to oneself and others with ‘sincerity,’
but which lacks deep connections to action” (p. 426; see also Audi, 1982, p. 138). The
possessor of an avowal of p is capable of consciously reflecting on her verbal
endorsement of p and considering it as a sincere conviction, namely not a lie (or the

37

Some might wonder why we should consider “an avowal of p” as the necessary attitude
involved in self-deception, since its acquisition or maintenance does not seem to necessarily be
related to the occurrence of the self-deceiving process at first glance. Yet, Audi (1982) clearly
indicates that one is in self-deception with respect to p when one is motivated to put one’s
belief that not-p into the unconscious mind and be disposed to avow p because of a certain
want(s) (p. 137). While the (unconscious) belief that not-p is an evidence-warranted attitude
representing the access-to-information-element, the disposition implies the acquisition of an
avowal of p. In this sense, in the phenomenon of self-deception, the acquisition of an avowal of
p is precisely caused by the operative motivation(s) involved in the phenomenon, in which
some sort of cognitive process must be involved (namely, the self-deceiving process). In
addition, we should note that an avowal of p is not a kind of attitude that can be immune to the
power of evidence, as Audi (1982) acknowledges that evidence supporting not-p could threaten
the maintenance of this avowal (p. 137).
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like) (Audi, 1982, p. 140).38 However, such a sincere avowal can never be a cause of
non-verbal action in the way that doxastic attitudes are, and it does not entail any
corresponding doxastic attitude (Audi, 1982, p. 138).39 Audi (1982) and Rey (1988)
think that, in a typical case of self-deception, the involved subject should verbally
endorse p, whereas her non-verbal behavior cannot support the attribution of a belief
that p. Accordingly, they both argue that such an inconsistency reveals that the
involved subject holds an avowal of p rather than a belief that p.

Van Leeuwen (2007) points out at least two reasons why the avowal view is
flawed. First, there is no theoretical or example-based reason for supposing a
restriction on the connections between the necessary attitude(s) involved in
self-deception and non-verbal behavior in the way described by this view (Van
Leeuwen, 2007). Second, Van Leeuwen (2007) asserts that by referring to (alleged)
cases of self-deception, we can see that the necessary attitude(s) is probably
context-independent in character. If this is the case, it suggests that this attitude is not
likely to be an avowal, as an avowal can only manifest itself in a limited range of
situations.

38

According to the avowal view, a self-deceived subject should lack the knowledge of what
kind of positive attitude towards p she actually holds. Despite this, I believe it is reasonable to
assume that an avowal of p is not stored in one’s unconscious mind, by comparing it to Audi’s
idea of “unconscious belief.” As Audi (1982) explains, his idea of “unconscious belief” is very
much like that of a conscious one since it can also manifest itself in a subject’s consciousness
and (both verbal and non-verbal) behavior (p. 137). However, the verbal evidence of an
unconscious belief is limited to be some kind of slips of the tongue only (Ibid.). More
importantly, when that unconscious belief does manifest itself in the subject's consciousness
and behavior, she is very unlikely to consciously attribute such manifestations to her or
consider that belief as the cause of her actions, unless she gets extra help (Ibid.). Given that an
avowal of p is precisely related to one’s conscious verbal endorsement, I do not see the reason
for insisting that it should be put inside one’s unconscious mind.
39 In other words, an avowal of p can only cause verbal behavior privately or publicly.
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Van Leeuwen (2007) elaborates on the first flaw by referring to the following
(alleged) case of self-deception, herein named the case of “business crisis”:

Let’s consider a business owner. Her business has been successful until a
year ago, but has been running at a bad loss and shows no sign of getting
better. [...] Nevertheless, she wants badly for her business to succeed and
insists that it will turn around. She has the opportunity to sell off her current
assets for a considerable sum. Instead, she takes out loans against those
assets such that everything will go to the bank if the business fails. [...] If
she doesn’t actually believe her business will turn around, how does it come
about that—at the very time it would be best to cut losses—she takes out a
loan to save the business? [...] We can contrast the self-deceived business
woman with another person we might call merely flaky or superficial.
Imagine a business woman whose business is failing in like fashion to that
of the self-deceived business woman. This one, however, doesn’t take out
the loans or attempt to save the business in any way, despite insisting that
she can turn the business around. The business woman who doesn’t take
action is just being flakey, talking one way and acting in a way that
indicates contrary beliefs. (p. 423-432)

Indeed, there is something unexplained in the case of “business crisis” if the necessary
attitude involved in self-deception is an avowal of p, which cannot generate non-verbal
actions. As Van Leeuwen (2007) contends, even if the evidence of the necessary
attitude(s) often consists of verbal behavior in many alleged cases of self-deception, we
do not have to assume that this attitude must lack a connection with non-verbal
behavior (p. 431-432). Given this, it will be wrong to think that the necessary attitude
should be an avowal of p.
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Regarding the second flaw, Van Leeuwen (2007) states that, even though
cognitive attitudes other than beliefs may also play a role in the constitution of actions,
only beliefs can causally affect one’s actions in a way that is independent of contexts.40
Hence if the necessary attitude affects the constitution of actions in a way that seems
not to be limited to specific contexts, the necessary attitude should be a doxastic one. In
view of this idea, Van Leeuwen (2007) reconsiders the case of “business crisis”:

It is clear that her action of taking out loans to keep the business afloat is
driven to a great extent by her self-deception. But is the cognitive attitude
underlying this action context sensitive, i.e., only psychomechanically
effective in certain kinds of context? It is more likely that its influence on
action pervades many contexts, such as speech, planning various endeavors,
taking out loans, and considering whether to quit. If this is the case, then
the product of her self-deception forms the default for action relative to the
other, context-sensitive cognitive attitudes. (p. 435-436)

If Van Leeuwen (2007) is right, the necessary attitude is more likely to be a doxastic
attitude that can make a given subject count as believing that p, namely a full belief
that p or a degree of belief that p which is over 0.5.41 But then, it turns out that the
discussion of the avowal view has led us to say the necessary attitude involved in
self-deception is identical to the one involved in wishful thinking.
40

We can compare “imagination” with “beliefs” to demonstrate the difference. “Imagination”
can only cause actions in the context of making-believe, while beliefs are the default
background for the constitution of actions under various contexts (Van Leeuwen, 2007, p. 434).
For example, my belief that I am a female can causally affect many of my actions in different
contexts. When I am reporting my gender, I will say “female.” When I am deciding what to
wear to a wedding, I will immediately look for a long dress rather than a suit for men. When I
am trying to imagine myself as the opposite gender, I will imagine that “I am a male.”
41 If the given subject should not count as believing that p, then why does she behave as if she
assumes that p is true?
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2.4.2 Psychological categories, such as a hope that p or a desire to believe that p
In an attempt to account for the unwarranted-attitude-element by taking the
affective approach, Archer (2013) contends that there is no explanatory need to
attribute a belief that p or a degree of belief that p to self-deceived subjects, since their
hope that p or desire to believe that p (or some other affective attitudes similar to the
two) can successfully explain why they (internally and externally) behave as if p (p.
277).42 Yet, apart from just being the manifestation of the necessary attitudes, Archer
(2013) also points out that this “as-if-p” behavior itself also helps to further generates
“evidence” that can maintain one’s hope that p (or the like) in the face of contrary
evidence, such as “social evidence” (p. 277).43

42

According to Archer (2013), this “as-if-p” behavior refers to one’s verbal behavior that
seemingly suggests a belief that p (p. 277). In addition to telling others that p is true,
self-deceived subjects also continually tell themselves that p is true when they engage in such a
kind of acting as-if (Ibid.). In this sense, in Archer’s (2013) view, a hope that p (or the like) is
very similar to an avowal of p, although Archer does not explicitly require the possessor of a
hope that p (or the like) to avow p with sincerity. Yet, given what was mentioned in section
2.4.1, we should note that the evidence of the necessary attitude(s) should not be considered as
verbal behavior only.
43 As Archer (2013) admits, the “as-if-p” behavior is a kind of self-deceitful strategy adopted
by self-deceived subjects (namely a part of the self-deceiving process/cognition) (note. 16).
Also, we can infer from Archer's (2013) idea that evidence in favor of not-p does threaten the
maintenance of those suggested affective attitudes, which reveals that they are able to be
properly affected by the power of evidence in ideal circumstances. Recall that the necessary
attitude(s) has to be an unwarranted attitude(s) with its acquisition or maintenance grounded in,
or at least related to, the self-deceiving process. Now we can see why those affective attitudes
suggested by Archer (2013) should be treated as the necessary attitudes involved in
self-deception. First, given that the available evidence must be overall in favor of not-p in cases
of self-deception, their maintenance necessarily relies on the occurrence of the self-deceitful
strategies (such as the performance of “as-if-p” behavior). Second, following the above idea,
we can say they are “unwarranted” in the sense that they fail to be properly affected by the
power of the available evidence.
71

However, Chan and Rowbottom (2019) argue that, once Archer admits that a
suspicion that p entails beliefs with p in their contents, the idea seems to hold for other
affective attitudes as well:

For example, having a hope that p or an anxiety that p appears to entail
having a non-zero degree of belief that p is true or a belief (or reasonably
high degree of belief) that p is epistemically possible. One does not hope to
win the first and second prizes in a lottery when one is certain that one only
has one lottery ticket and that each ticket can only win one prize. (p. 1211)

As mentioned in section 2.3.3, a belief with a particular proposition in its content
would better be interpreted as a degree of belief in that proposition. In addition, Archer
(2013) acknowledges that, in paradigm cases of self-deception, self-deceived subjects
behave as if they assume that p is true, which is consistent with the general agreement
among other theorists who are interested in the study of self-deception (p. 276-278).
For example, the involved subjects may strongly defend p against criticisms. As a
result, it turns out that the affective approach suggests the necessary attitude involved
in self-deception should be (or at least necessarily entail) a degree of belief that p,
which should make a given subject count as believing that p. If this is the case, this
approach also fails to specify the unwarranted-attitude-element of self-deception as
something different from that of wishful thinking.

2.4.3 A (full) belief that believing that p
Since both the behavioral approach and the affective approach turn out to blur
the boundary between self-deception and wishful thinking, maybe we should consider
the issue in a doxastic way. Some philosophers, like Funkhouser (2005), argue that we
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should shift the content of the necessary attitude involved in self-deception to the
second-order level and attribute a false belief that “I believe that p” to self-deceived
subjects. On Funkhouser’s (2005) view, such second-order beliefs help their possessors
with four abilities (p. 305-306). The agents will then be able to report that p both
publicly and privately, use such second-order beliefs in practical reasoning, and
integrate into theoretical reasoning the embedded first-order belief that p (Ibid.).
Funkhouser (2005) also emphasizes that the last two abilities do not hold when the
relevant second-order belief is false (p. 306). Therefore, since the belief that “I believe
that p” introduced in Funkhouser’s (2005) model of self-deception should be a false
one, this belief can only cause the involved subject to avow that p publicly or privately
but lack connections with her planning of further actions and inner deliberation. If
Funkhouser (2005) is right, the necessary attitude involved in self-deception should be
self-focused rather than world-focused. As the necessary attitude involved in wishful
thinking is supposed to be a world-focused one, the second-order proposal could be
useful for solving the distinction problem.

However, there are at least three reasons to reject this second-order proposal.
First, it suggests a dual model of self-deception. As Archer (2018) asserts, “[a]ccording
to ‘transparency’ theorists about self-knowledge, the question whether I believe that p
is transparent to the question whether p” (p. 3044). That is to say, when an agent
considers whether she believes p, what she has in her mind should be the question
whether she takes p to be true. Following this idea, in order to acquire the false
second-order belief that p, the subject must first prompt self-deceitful strategies for
acquiring the first-order belief that p. If this is the case, the success of this second-order
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model of self-deception actually depends on whether the subject can make herself
self-deceive that p. Incidentally, if a given subject succeeds in deceiving herself into
acquiring a belief that p, it does not seem to be wrong to obtain further a belief that “I
believe that p” since it is actually a true belief based on her introspection.

Maybe we could assume that the “transparency” theory is not applicable to the
study of self-deception. However, the second-order proposal is still problematic
because there is just no reason to limit the connections between the necessary attitude
and non-verbal behavior in the way described by the second-order proposal. As we
have seen in the previous discussion of the avowal view, if a particular kind of
motivated irrationality can only affect one’s non-verbal actions, it should better be
classified as “flakiness” (Van Leeuwen, 2007, p. 432). So, it is fair to say we should not
restrict the relations between the second-order belief that p and the possessor’s
non-verbal actions in the way described. Now, let us assume that the second-order
proposal is right for the sake of argument. If there is no such limitation in these
relations, all the four abilities of the second-order belief should remain fully functional.
Based on Funkhouser’s (2005) idea, such a situation will probably suggest that the
possessor of this second-order belief that p does hold the corresponding first-order
belief that p.44 Given that the available evidence must overall warrant not-p in cases of
self-deception, this first-order belief that p involved in the phenomenon has to be
generated through the self-deceiving process as well. Accordingly, proponents of this
proposal then face a dilemma if they refuse to accept that the

44

Funkhouser (2005) does not explain whether there is an exceptional case in which the
involved second-order belief is false, but all the four abilities still function. So, I would assume
that there is no such case.
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unwarranted-attitude-element should primarily be represented by a belief that p. This
proposal suggests either a dual model of self-deception, which would be a less
economical strategy, or an unreasonable idea that an agent still has to “deceive” herself
into acquiring a belief that “I believe that p” even if she does hold the corresponding
first-order belief that p.

Finally, it seems that “a belief that ‘I believe that p’” is just a variant of “a
belief that p.” Recall that p can represent any unwarranted proposition that the ongoing
self-deception is about. Similar to the counter-argument we have seen in section 2.2.2,
I do not see the reason why a subject cannot be in self-deception with respect to the
proposition “I believe in a specific proposition.” Unless someone offers a convincing
reason for rejecting such a situation, the difference between proposal (J) and the
second-order belief proposal is uncertain.

If any of the above three counter-arguments is acceptable, it will turn out that
the second-order proposal leads us to attribute a first-order belief that p to a
self-deceived subject. Thus, the second-order proposal fails to address the difference
between the unwarranted-attitude-element of self-deception and that of wishful
thinking.

2.4.4 The indeterminate approach
I am going to discuss the last option for specifying the content of the
unwarranted-attitude-element, namely the indeterminate proposal. This approach is
developed in view of the idea that sometimes it is indeterminate as to what a given
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subject believes with regard to a particular proposition, since “believe” is just a “vague
predicate” (Funkhouser, 2009; Porcher, 2012; Schwitzgebel, 2010).45 Proponents of
this idea view “belief” as a folk-psychological term merely used to conclude the overall
status of a particular group of cognitive states, or dispositions, possessed by a given
subject. Thus, they contend that it is wrong to talk of indicators of one’s “belief state,”
as there is nothing like that from the very beginning. For instance, while we usually
think that “consciously regarding p as true in one’s reasoning” is a significant piece of
evidence supporting the attribution of a belief that p, they only consider such a
situation as one of the many conditions that help us to decide whether one meets the
folk-psychological stereotype for “believing that p.”46 If we want to develop more
informative explanations to some complex cases (like self-deception), we should shift
from talking about a simple attribution (or denial) of a vague predicate(s) to careful
descriptions of cognitive states, or dispositions, concerning p possessed by the
involved subjects. There are at least two ways to apply this idea to the framework of
self-deception.

First, as I have mentioned in section 1.1.2.2, Funkhouser (2009) focuses on
studying a particular type of self-deception that is called “deeply conflicted

45

As Schwitzgebel (2010) illustrates, “tall” is another example of vague predicates:
Is a man tall if he’s five foot eleven inches? In some contexts a simple yes or no
may suffice, but a more careful ascription will instead clarify with specific detail:
‘Well, he’s five-eleven.’ (p. 535)
46 In this sense, it is hard to tell whether one is conscious of one’s “belief that p” since “belief”
is not something in one’s mind but a folk-psychological concept only. Following this idea, the
discussion of the unwarranted-attitude-element of self-deception is actually the study of
whether self-deceived subjects fit the stereotype for “believing that p.” Incidentally, the
conditions for meeting the folk-psychological stereotype for “believing that p” should involve
both conscious and unconscious behavior.
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self-deception.”47 In the light of the inconsistency presented in deeply conflicted cases,
Funkhouser (2009) suggests that the failure of various views which are aimed at
explaining such cases “is not due to our limited epistemic perspective, rather it is a real
indeterminacy in the world,” namely a real indeterminacy in the concept of “(full)
belief” in folk-psychology (p. 10).

Owing to this idea, Funkhouser (2009) contends:

[A] person’s beliefs are constituted by their status with respect [to] […]
different regarding-as-true stances, rather than these being mere indicators
or evidence of their belief state. In this sense, [...] belief reduces to, or is
nothing over and above, these regarding-as-true stances (p. 9).

Therefore, Funkhouser (2009) thinks that when we consider deeply conflicted cases,
“we must descend to a lower-level (i.e. the component regarding-as-true stances) in
order to adequately characterize the cognitive states of at least some of the
self-deceived [subject],” or we can say “It is simply indeterminate what the person
believes [with respect to p] in these situations” (p. 12).48 Funkhouser (2009) also
clearly indicates that self-deceived subjects are motivated to acquire “specific values
for one or more of the component regarding-as-true stances” towards p through the
self-deceiving process, rather than a particular belief simpliciter (p. 13). So, for
detailedly explaining the direct result of the self-deceiving process, which is also

47

We might refer to the case of “Nicole” mentioned in section 1.1.2.2 for understanding the
idea of “deeply conflicted self-deception.”
48 We should note that “being indeterminate what one believes with respect to p” is not a
specific kind of mental state that one can be determinately in, but a brief description used to
express the situation that one fails to appropriately match or mismatch the folk-psychological
concept of “believing that p.”
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termed the product of self-deception by Funkhouser (2009), in deeply conflicted
self-deception, we should make a list of regarding-as-true stances concerning p owned
by the involved subject (p. 9). For example, as Funkhouser (2009) explains, in the case
of “Nicole,” Nicole is motivated to at least “regard p as true in internal and external
reporting senses” (and obtain the disposition to do so) (p. 13). In addition, Funkhouser
(2009) notes that self-deception does not produce a common product since there can be
“many possible forms that deeply conflicted self-deception can take” (p. 9). Hence
Funkhouser (2009) thinks that the study should also be developed on a case-by-case
basis.

Second, Schwitzgebel (2010), along with Porcher (2012), states that we should
take a dispositionalist approach to the issue and then consider cases of self-deception to
be “in-between” cases of believing. The “in-between” view (as one version of
dispositionalism about beliefs) suggested by Schwitzgebel (2001, 2010) is conceived
based on the observation that there are a number of cases in which a direct “yes” or
“no” to the question “whether the involved subject believes that p” seems to be
unsuitable (at least at first sight). Given this observation, Schwitzgebel (2002) infers
that “beliefs” should be dispositional in character and “to believe that P […] is nothing
more than to match to an appropriate degree and in appropriate respects the
dispositional stereotype for believing that P” (p. 253). In this sense, it is no surprise
that “there will be in-betweenish cases in which the relevant disposition or dispositions
are only partly possessed” (Schwitzgebel, 2010, p. 535). Schwitzgebel (2001) quotes
Ryle in order to demonstrate his idea, discussing what it is “to believe that the ice is
dangerously thin”:
78

[It is] to be unhesitant in telling oneself and others that it is thin, in
acquiescing in other people’s assertions to that effect, in objecting to
statements to the contrary, in drawing consequences from the original
proposition, and so forth. But it is also to be prone to skate warily, to
shudder, to dwell in imagination on possible disasters and to warn other
skaters. It is a propensity not only to make certain theoretical moves but
also to make certain executive and imaginative moves as well as to have
certain feelings. (as cited in p. 81)

Schwitzgebel (2010) briefly mentions that he prefers to handle the doxastic issue of
self-deception by the in-betweenish treatment although he does not provide a detailed
account of this.

Porcher (2012) further explores the “in-between” view and discusses whether it
is useful for the study of the unwarranted-attitude-element of self-deception. To start
with, Porcher (2012) points out that it seems to be theoretically impossible for us to
account for the inconsistency manifested by the behavior of self-deceived subjects with
the folk-psychological concept of (full) beliefs. Porcher (2012) demonstrates his idea
by quoting a case of a cancer victim, which is a famous example of self-deception
originally asserted by Rorty (1988). As Rorty (1988) writes:

Dr. Laetitia Androvna [...] [is a] specialist in the diagnosis of cancer, whose
fascination for the obscure does not usually blind her to the obvious, she
has begun to misdescribe and ignore symptoms that the most junior
premedical student would recognize as the unmistakable symptoms of the
late stages of a currently incurable form of cancer. Normally introspective,
given to consulting friends on important matters, she now
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uncharacteristically deflects their questions and attempts to discuss her
condition. Nevertheless, also uncharacteristically, she is bringing her
practical and financial affairs into order: though young and by no means
affluent, she is drawing up a detailed will. Never a serious correspondent,
reticent about matters of affection, she has taken to writing effusive letters
to distant friends and relatives, intimating farewells, and urging them to
visit her soon. (p. 11)
Let p be “I have a currently incurable form of cancer.” It is noticeable that neither the
attribution of a (full) belief that p nor the attribution of a (full) belief that not-p seems
to describe the overall behavior of Dr. Androvna accurately. Porcher (2012) indicates
that this explanatory failure actually reveals “unrealistic assumptions about the limits
of folk psychology” (p. 79). Given this doubt of the adequacy of folk psychological
concepts, for explaining the phenomenon of self-deception, Porcher (2012) contends:

[We should] set off from an account that identifies believing with being
disposed to act and react in various ways in various circumstances. Better
yet: an account which is built upon a broad dispositional base. [...] After
descending to a lower level of description than that of “believes that p,” and
articulating the subject’s dispositional structure in the finest possible detail
we can, we may complement our description by matching certain
dispositional patterns with certain belief stereotypes, or by investigating the
etiology of the relevant phenomenon to propose an answer as to why and
how the mixed set of dispositions is acquired, etc. (p. 79-80)

It appears that the indeterminate approach can provide us with an innovative
method of viewing self-deception without losing the diversity of it. According to this
approach, we should withhold the attribution and denial of a “belief that p” to
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self-deceived subjects since they only partly meet the folk-psychological stereotype for
“believing that p.”49 As we agree that wishful thinkers determinately believe that p,
namely, fit the stereotype for “believing that p,” the indeterminate approach seems to
be able to solve the distinction problem in a peculiar manner.

However, it is doubtful that this approach can account for the irrational nature
of self-deception. As mentioned previously, the irrationality of self-deception depends
on whether the involved subject behaves in a way that is contradictory to what the
available evidence actually warrants, namely not-p. This criterion suggests the
access-to-information-element, which means that the subject must be aware of this
evidence and its natural implication(s) (as I have discussed in section 2.3.1). Yet it is
unclear how we could address the access-to-information-element with Funkhouser’s
(2009) idea or the “in-between” view without causing a problem. If the indeterminate
approach is true, self-deceived subjects will have to appropriately fit the
folk-psychological stereotype for “believing that not-p” in order to count as being
aware of the natural implication(s) of the available evidence (that overall supports
not-p). This entails that a determinate answer to whether one believes that not-p can be
offered. But, as Schwitzgebel (2010) contends, the conditions for meeting the
folk-psychological stereotype for “believing that not-p” necessarily conflict with the

49

Recall that the available evidence must warrant not-p in cases of self-deception. If a subject
successfully behaves, or is disposed to behave, in a way that generally agrees with the available
evidence which overall warrants not-p, she should sufficiently fit the folk-psychological
stereotype for “believing that not-p.” However, since Schwitzgebel (2010) points out that the
conditions for meeting the folk-psychological stereotype for “believing that not-p” must
conflict with the conditions for meeting the folk-psychological stereotype for “believing that
p,” I take it that one cannot determinately believe that not-p without determinately failing to
believe that p at the same time. Accordingly, since self-deceived subjects do not determinately
fail to meet the folk-psychological stereotype for “believing that p,” we can say they are
irrational in an evidentialist sense.
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conditions for meeting the folk-psychological stereotype for “believing that p” (p. 544).
50

If this is the case, a determinate positive answer to whether one believes that not-p

can entail a determinate negative answer to whether one believes that p.51 Hence
proponents of this approach face a dilemma, namely, either the
access-to-information-element can be addressed in a way that a determinate positive
answer to whether self-deceived subjects believe that not-p is not needed, or there can
be both a determinate and an indeterminate answer to whether one believes that p in
cases of self-deception.

Furthermore, even if we assume that the indeterminate approach is acceptable
and different “beliefs” can be reduced to different groups of regarding-as-true stances
or dispositions, this does not entail that a determinate answer to the doxastic issue can
never be provided. As a start, Rowbottom (2016) already demonstrates how degrees of
belief, which are not kinds of vague belief, can co-exist with the assumption that
beliefs are dispositional in character (p. 735-736).52 Then, since both Funkhouser
(2009) and Porcher (2012) are optimistic about the prospect of developing an
explanatory account of self-deception by listing how an involved subject behaves or is
disposed to behave under different circumstances, I will assume that the list should
contain a finite number of conditions for fitting the stereotype for “believing that p”

50

That is to say, suppose the conditions for fitting the folk-psychological stereotype for
“believing that not-p” are A, B, C, and D, then a person who determinately “believes” that
not-p cannot simultaneously fulfill the conditions for fitting the stereotype for “believing that
p,” namely, not-A, not-B, not-C, and not-D.
51 Since proponents of the indeterminate approach do not specify whether self-deceived
subjects need to constantly fail to appropriately fit the stereotype for “believing that p” during
their whole self-deception, I will just assume that self-deceived subjects constantly fail to do
so.
52 But we should also notice that we do not have to accept dispositionalism about belief in
order to argue for the idea of “degrees of belief” (Rowbottom, 2016, p. 733).
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(regardless of how difficult this task may be). Suppose there are a hundred conditions
for fitting the stereotype for “believing that p” and you fulfill more than 50 % of them
(without being affected by other psychological factors or involving behavior that is
aimed at trying your luck).53 As I see it, there is no reason to deny that you hold a
certain degree of belief that p with its value over a particular threshold that makes it
count as believing that p.

Admittedly, it is extremely challenging to list out all the conditions for meeting
the folk-psychological stereotype for “believing that p,” and the numerical attributions
of degrees of belief are often inadequate. But these two concerns do not suggest that a
determinate answer to the doxastic issue concerning p is theoretically impossible even
if we assume that the indeterminate approach is acceptable. Besides, some theorists
already suggest that the inconsistency present in self-deception gives grounds for
reconceptualizing the necessary attitude(s) in terms of degrees of belief (or degrees of
conviction) instead of full beliefs (Chan and Rowbottom, 2019; Lynch, 2012). Then
again, if the indeterminate approach somehow allows us to attribute a degree of belief
that p (with a value that makes it count as believing that p) to self-deceived subjects,
this implies that this approach also fails to locate the difference between self-deception
and wishful thinking.

2.5 Options outside the framework

53

Some may argue that the relevant conditions could have different weights. But Funkhouser
(2009) rejects such an idea as he thinks that the failure of explaining self-deception already
implies “there is no privileged weighting of these [conditions] that determines ‘real belief’” (p.
11).
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If it turns out that none of the three basic elements listed in the “vague
consensus” can cast light on how to solve the distinction problem, some may wonder if
this situation suggests that there should be a fourth element (or even more). There is at
least one existing option for how to restrict the definition of self-deception by appeal to
a feature outside the current framework:

(M)

Self-knowledge (Mele, 2012; Nelkin, 2002; Noordhof, 2009;

Scott-Kakures, 2002)

However, the problem with such an appeal is that the necessity of the new element
suggested is not guaranteed by the consensus in the literature. Therefore, proponents of
any option outside the framework have to provide a reason for its necessity. Next, I am
going to examine whether the supporters of proposal (M) succeed in doing so.

2.5.1 Self-knowledge
The proponents of proposal (M) contend that for locating the essential feature
of self-deception, we have to pay attention to the issue of self-knowledge. While some
of them, such as Nelkin (2002) and Noordhof (2009), think that a lack of
self-knowledge should be included as one of the essential conditions for becoming
self-deceived, the others, such as Mele (2012) and Scott-Kakures (2002), contend that a
failure in self-knowledge is necessary for the phenomenon to be possible. It is
noteworthy that a lack of self-knowledge is quite different from a failure in
self-knowledge. A failure in self-knowledge involves an obvious mistake about
oneself, but a lack of self-knowledge may merely be ignorance about a certain aspect
of the self.
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We have already looked at a proposal which argues that a failure in
self-knowledge is necessary, namely the second-order proposal presented in section
2.4.3. The supporters of the second-order proposal take a firm stand on the issue by
proposing the necessary attitude involved in self-deception is precisely the doxastic
attitude that reveals such a failure in self-knowledge. Nevertheless, we do not need to
defend this restriction on the necessary attitude even if we agree that there is a failure
in self-knowledge occurring in self-deception. For example, Scott-Kakures (2002),
who does not accept the second-order proposal, suggests that a self-deceived subject
must have a misconception about what prompts her relevant cognitive activities in
order to make the self-deceitful project possible (p. 599). Indeed, we can easily
imagine that if one could always effectively estimate the role played by motivation in
one’s daily cognition, one would not be liable to self-deception (Scott-Kakures, 2002,
p. 584). But how should we address this misconception? It seems to me that a doxastic
attitude is at hand, and Scott-Kakures (2002) also agrees:

[The subject] believes [...] that her embrace of a conclusion is the result of
her epistemic evaluations of what her reasons recommend. In fact, her
doxastic activity is [...] shaped by desire and interest. She believes that her
inquiry and her reaching of her conclusion are guided by her epistemic
appraisals or judgments. She is in error about what animates her
investigations. (p. 595; italics added)

Incidentally, Mele (2012) also accepts this idea and agrees that the following condition
could count as one of the (jointly) sufficient conditions for a subject S to be
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self-deceived: “S’s acquiring the belief that p is a product of ‘reflective, critical
reasoning,’ and S is wrong in regarding that reasoning as properly directed” (p. 12).

However, it appears that Scott-Kakures’s (2002) idea will lead to an infinite
model of self-deception. Apart from acquiring the necessary attitude towards p, this
idea requires a self-deceived subject to obtain further a false belief that q, where q
stands for “my attitude towards p is a product of proper reasoning.” Although it is
unclear whether Scott-Kakures treats this false belief that q as a random error or a
resulting attitude of irrational cognition, I believe neither of these options is acceptable
to choose. If the false belief that q is just a random error, the necessary attitude towards

p should also be a mere mistake since, according to Scott-Kakures (2002), the
acquisition of the necessary attitude depends on whether the involved subject can
successfully obtain the false belief that q. If the false belief that q is caused by some
kind of irrational cognition, it seems that it should be a product of self-deception as
well. Then, based on Scott-Kakures’s (2002) idea, for making possible the acquisition
of the false belief that q, the subject has to hold a false belief that n concerning why she
gets the belief that q. Once again, for making possible the acquisition of the false belief
that n, the subject has to hold a false belief that o concerning why she gets the belief
that n. Such a kind of regression can proceed ad infinitum. Hence a self-deceived
subject has to acquire countless false beliefs for making her self-deception with respect
to p possible, which makes the whole idea unconvincing.

On the other hand, Nelkin (2002) and Noordhof (2009) think it is far too strong
to suggest that a failure in self-knowledge is necessary for self-deception since a lack
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of self-knowledge will be enough for making the phenomenon to be possible. Nelkin
(2002) suggests that a lack of awareness of the self-deceiving motivation behind one’s
cognition might be psychologically necessary for the self-deceitful strategies to occur
(p. 395). Based on this suggestion, Noordhof (2009) further asserts that ignorance
about “some element of the psychological history characteristic” behind the acquisition
of the necessary attitude is essential if we would like to have a real case of
self-deception (p. 62). Noordhof (2009) argues for his idea by sketching examples in
which the subjects do not seem to be self-deceived while fulfilling all the basic
elements of self-deception. Noordhof (2009) writes:

[T]here are those who self-consciously take their belief in God to involve a
leap in faith not supported by the evidence. They may also appreciate that
their belief in God stems from the way their motivational states influence
their belief-forming processes. They are happy to recognize this because
fundamentally they approve of their belief in God. It seems to them
psychologically and spiritually the right thing to believe. Indeed, the
possibility of treating the evidence relating to God’s existence as just
evidence to be assessed in disinterested terms seems to fail to capture the
importance of this belief for them. (p. 60-61)

As Noordhof (2009) explains, subjects who believe in God in the way described do not
seem to be self-deceived since there is something significantly different between this
case of religious beliefs and (allegedly) cases of self-deception – “the subjects in
question may know precisely how their motivational states affect their beliefs and yet
accept it” (p. 61). Thus, a lack of self-knowledge should be one of the essential
elements that decide whether a case counts as self-deception.
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I am not going to deny that a lack of self-knowledge should be included as one
of the elements of self-deception. But I am afraid that it is normal for us to find this
element present in various types of cognition other than self-deception, including
those that are unbiased. In fact, this is the very reason why Scott-Kakures’s (2002)
argues for the failure in self-knowledge proposal:

Such a lack of knowledge about the various causal influences upon the
shape or direction of our cognitive activities would appear to be far from
exceptional. Indeed, one of the chief conclusions of Nisbett and Wilson’s
important and influential 1977 study is that we are quite typically unaware
of the causal role played by various factors in the formation of our attitudes
and judgments. If this is on the mark, such a failure of self-knowledge –
where by this we mean a lack of a true account of the causal histories of our
attitudes – will be far from distinctive of self-deception. (p. 598)

To demonstrate this idea, Scott-Kakures (2002) offers some examples which
involve a lack of self-knowledge yet do not seem to be cases of self-deception.
Scott-Kakures (2002) argues that the case of “the dog owner,” which originates in
Frederick Siegler’s 1968 work, is one of the classic examples of this sort:

[I]f A simply mistakes my dog for his, even if this could be due to a desire
that the dog be his dog and when he fears and suspects that it might be
mine, it is difficult to think of such a case as one of self-deception, and this
is because when one’s desires and fears distort perception we are inclined to
think of there being a psychological distortion which results in a mistake of
which the person himself normally is not aware. (as cited in p. 586; see also
Siegler, 1968, p. 161)
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Furthermore, Scott-Kakures (2002) also cites some psychological studies showing that
one can be unaware of the causal role played by extra-epistemic factors in the
formation of one’s judgment even when one does not have any personal stake in the
matter and also be forewarned about the possibility of misjudging (p. 592-593).

To be brief, I accept that a lack of self-knowledge may typically be present in
the phenomenon of self-deception. After all, the very reason why intentionalists adopt
the idea of “partitioning” or the primary motivation for non-intentionalists to define the
phenomenon as a purely causal mechanism is that we do not want to suggest that an
agent could be knowingly deceived by herself. But, as Scott-Kakures (2002) argues, the
fact is that a lack of self-knowledge pervades many cases of daily cognition, including
both motivated and unmotivated irrationality. Recall that the purpose of the current
study is to find the difference(s) between self-deception and other nearby phenomena.
Since it is fair to assume that such a lack of self-knowledge may also typically be
present in the phenomena similar to self-deception, proposal (M) does not seem very
promising.

2.6 The combination of access to information and an unwarranted attitude(s)
concerning p
As mentioned at the end of section 2.3.4, the distinction problem can likely be
solved completely by specifying the combination of the access-to-information-element
and the unwarranted-attitude-element properly. Previous discussions have already
provided advice on how to specify the two elements separately. However, the task of
putting the two together is not as straightforward as it seems. Many theorists who also
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see the need to address the combination insist that this combination is supposed to
account for some sort of “tension” (Archer, 2013; Funkhouser, 2005; Graham, 1986;
Lynch, 2012; Rorty, 1988). Therefore, we need first to find out what this tension is
before we continue the discussion.

2.6.1 Tension
A number of philosophers take for granted that a certain “tension” at the
behavioral level should be present in paradigm cases of self-deception since this is
what the empirical evidence shows (Archer, 2013, p. 265; Audi, 1982, p. 138;
Funkhouser, 2005, p. 302; Pedrini, 2012; Porcher, 2012, p. 68). As Porcher (2012)
indicates:

[M]any times the verbal behavior of the self-deceived will indicate that they
believe that p and their nonverbal behavior will indicate that they believe
that not-p [...] [but] in some cases the nonverbal behavior as a whole will be
inconsistent. (p. 68)

Such tension may be referred to as “behavioral” tension (Funkhouser, 2005, p. 296).
According to Lynch (2012), the precise definition of behavioral tension is “being
inclined to act in some ways that seem more consistent with believing that p and in
others that seem more consistent with believing that not-p” (p. 436). Admittedly, it is
quite natural for ordinary people to behave inconsistently during the transition from a
particular consideration to the drawing of the conclusion relevant to that consideration.
However, many theorists still find the distinctive pattern of behavior involved in
self-deception very interesting since it continues to persist even after the self-deceiving
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conclusion has already been drawn (namely, formed the necessary attitude(s)). Recall
the case of “Nicole.” Nicole has “successfully” been motivated to verbally endorse the
claim that Tony is a faithful husband (p), and yet she still avoids contact with sources of
evidence which may suggest the contrary. In order to explain this kind of unusual
behavior found in many alleged cases, theorists generally struggle to make the
combination be able to generate behavior that looks inconsistent as a whole (Archer,
2013; Funkhouser, 2005; Graham, 1986; Rorty, 1988). Similarly, I agree that special
attention should be paid to the behavioral tension that occurs after the self-deceiving
conclusion, and I will tend to refer to it as the “expected behavioral tension.”

Some theorists, such as Funkhouser (2005), further elaborate on this idea and
illustrate that the “tension” involved should be divided into “behavioral” and
“cognitive” parts (p. 296). Surely, it is reasonable to think that such a behavioral
inconsistency should be accompanied by a corresponding mental experience, if not a
manifestation of this mental experience.54 As such, besides behavioral tension,
self-deceived subjects are supposed to also experience cognitive tension (also called
“mental discomfort”) (Funkhouser, 2005, p. 296; Graham, 1986, p. 228; Lynch, 2012,
p. 440). Graham (1986) explains that this sort of tension can be understood as “the
feelings of ‘discomfort’ or ‘restlessness’,” such as “qualms, suspicions, misgivings, and
the like” (p. 226). Undoubtedly, it is not surprising that normal people should feel
discomfort when they are aware of pieces of evidence that threaten their desirable
proposition (except for people getting temporal help, such as those taking psychiatric
drugs), regardless of whether they are then motivated to engage in an irrational
54

If someone is engaging in such inconsistency but is unresponsive to it, we should doubt
whether she is a psychologically healthy person.
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cognition.55 In addition, it is typical for one to feel “in the middle” when one is in the
process of considering the truth and falsehood of some statements. Nevertheless, what
makes theorists fascinated is the empirical fact that in cases of self-deception, those
uncomfortable feelings continue to exist after the subjects have drawn the
self-deceiving conclusion (namely, formed the necessary attitude(s)). Likewise, I
contend that we should not omit the cognitive tension that occurs after the
self-deceiving conclusion, hereafter called the “expected cognitive tension.”56

Graham (1986) argues that the source of the expected cognitive tension is the
dissatisfaction with a clash between the awareness of contrary evidence and the attitude
that one has been motivated to possess (namely the necessary attitude(s)) (p. 228). With
Graham’s (1986) idea in mind, my view of the expected cognitive tension is that it
involves negative feelings generated when one is aware of contrary evidence and then
recognizes that this threatens the maintenance of the necessary attitude(s) while
(mentally) resisting to accept such a situation. Such resistance can easily be explained
as the product of the awareness of contrary evidence combined with the fact that one
has a stake in the issue (namely the motivation-element). This resistance will manifest
itself in specific actions, such as avoidance behavior.57 As Lynch (2012) puts it,
“mental tension is the experiential accompaniment for those cases in which behavioral
tension is present or liable to occur” (p. 435).

55

In other words, such discomfort can be understood as one’s negative emotional response to
the situation that there is a conflict(s) between the available evidence and one's desire or want
(or the like).
56 I will just use the term “expected tension” when I refer to both the expected behavioral
tension and the expected cognitive tension.
57 As Funkhouser (2005) argues, avoidance behavior reveals that the involved subject already
possesses sufficient information for concluding that not-p, and hence, conflicts with the
“as-if-p” behavior that is also supposed to be present in a case of self-deception.
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Some might wonder if it is necessary to address such tension (including the
expected tension), considering what we have just seen is based on empirical findings of
self-deception. Let us first consider the tension that occurs during the transition from
the consideration of whether p or not-p to the drawing of the self-deceiving conclusion.
58

I assume that the cognitive tension should at least be present at some point during the

transition since self-deceived subjects must be aware of the available evidence that
overall supports not-p for setting off the self-deceiving process (as mentioned in section
2.3.1).59 I propose naming this the “necessary cognitive tension.”60 On the other hand,
since theorists, such as Funkhouser (2005) and Lynch (2012), generally consider the
behavioral tension as a conflict(s) between one’s observable actions, it does not seem
right to require that it must exist during the transition. This is because it is reasonable to
think that physically disabled people (like stroke patients) are capable of self-deception.
In short, I hold that the combination must be specified in a way that can address the
necessary cognition tension, and I believe this task can easily be done, given that the
access-to-information-element is a necessary feature of self-deception.61

58

The transition involved in the phenomenon of self-deception should be understood as the
self-deceiving process. I believe it is evident that such a transition is a necessary part of
self-deception.
59 I do not intend to argue that the mentioned awareness (and also the cognitive tension) must
constantly exist during self-deception.
60 This necessary cognitive tension is also a manifestation of the psychology of one who is
motivated to engage in the self-deceiving process. We should note that, even if one is aware of
the contrary evidence, one needs not to struggle to explain it away (for finding a peace of
mind) when one is totally comfortable with such a situation.
61 Recall that the cognitive tension occurring during the transition is causally related to an
awareness of evidence that threatens the proposition that one has a stake in.
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Before considering the expected tension, I would like to briefly explain whether
the necessary cognitive tension can be eliminated completely through the
self-deceiving process, given that this process should help the involved subject to
mediate between the threat posed by the contrary evidence and her desire/want (or the
like). Some theorists, like Lynch (2012), think that this tension can be reduced, but not
thoroughly removed, through the process. As Lynch (2012) illustrates, while
self-deceived subjects put great efforts into the epistemic work to “construct
justifications for their preferred positions” during the self-deceiving process, their
concerted efforts are still “constrained by considerations of plausibility” (p. 440).
Undoubtedly, with this understanding, we cannot completely rule out the possibility
that a self-deceived subject might successfully explain away all the contrary evidence
at the moment when they draw the self-deceiving conclusion (Lynch, 2012, p. 442).
However, Lynch (2012) also argues that “self-deceivers are generally rational beings
who are generally sensitive to the force of good evidence, and that is not a contingent
truth about self-deceivers” (p. 442).62 Following this idea, it should be a conceptual
truth about self-deception that self-deceived subjects cannot be fully convinced that p
as if the available evidence is actually in favor of p, even if they are also affected by the
self-deceiving process.

Finally, let us consider the expected tension. Since self-deception needs not be
continued after the self-deceiving conclusion has been drawn, this sort of tension
should not be a necessary factor of self-deception. Admittedly, many classic examples
of self-deception are lengthy (like the case of “Nicole”). Nevertheless, theorists
62

If self-deceived subjects are not normal people, self-deception should actually be classified
as a psychologically abnormal phenomenon, just like delusion.
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generally accept that once the relevant conclusion is drawn, the involved subject can
already count as “being self-deceived.” For example, Mele (2012) suggests that the
“proto-analysis” of being self-deceived is to “acquire the belief [that p] in a suitably
biased way,” where the belief that p refers to the self-deceiving conclusion (p. 2).
However, although the expected tension does not necessarily occur in cases of
self-deception, the idea of the expected tension itself is still very essential to the study
of the distinction problem. Recall that theorists suggest that self-deception is a unique
phenomenon because it is associated with a wide range of doxastic states (as mentioned
in section 2.3.4). We should note that what happens during the transition from the
consideration of whether p or not-p to the corresponding conclusion is only one part of
the whole idea. Many theorists think that the expected tension is the by-product of the
manifestation of those doxastic states (Funkhouser, 2005, p. 302; Graham, 1986;
Porcher, 2012, p. 68). In other words, when self-deception is temporally extended, the
expected tension can give grounds for attributing a wide range of doxastic states to the
involved subject (Graham, 1986, p. 228). This is precisely why self-deception (and the
combination) must be analyzed in a way that can leave room for the expected tension to

be present if self-deception is temporally extended.63

2.6.2 Accounting for the combination
Some theorists insist that the best way to account for the tension (including the
expected tension) is to attribute a pair of contradictory beliefs that p and not-p to the
self-deceived subject (Graham, 1986; Rorty, 1988):

63

“Being temporally extended” means “being continued after the relevant conclusion is
drawn.”
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(N) A full belief + a contradictory full belief

The biggest obstacle with proposal (N) is the static paradox, which was mentioned
briefly in section 2.2.1 while examining the intentional proposal. According to Mele
(2001), the contradictory (full) beliefs proposal suggests an impossible state of mind in
the sense that “the very nature of belief” precludes such a state (p. 6-7).

Some may wonder why we must not believe p and not-p simultaneously,
although the two beliefs are logically conflicting. Indeed, Makinson (1965) points out
that we are sometimes justified to hold logically incompatible beliefs. To argue for this,
Makinson (1965) suggests the case of “the paradox of the preface,” in which it seems
rational for the involved subject to hold both the belief that “each assertion I made is
true” and the belief that “at least one assertion in the book is false,” though the two
beliefs should be logically contradictory.64 Nevertheless, Bordes (2001) asserts:

[T]he preface’s author does not believe that the same specific sentence is
both false and true: he does not simultaneously believe that p and not-p, but
in the truth of each of the specific sentences of his doxastic web and in the
generic sentence expressing the metabelief, unaware of the specific
sentences which contradict it. [...] Unlike the preface case, in self-deception

64

Makinson (1965) notes that many authors of academic books tend to admit in the preface
that there may be errors in the books, even though they should believe that the arguments in the
book are correct, as he puts it:
Suppose that in the course of his book a writer makes a great many assertions,
which we shall call s1, . . . , sn. Given each one of these, he believes that it is true.
If he has already written other books, and received corrections from readers and
reviewers, he may also believe that not everything he has written in his latest book
is true. His approach is eminently rational; he has learnt from experience. The
discovery of errors among statements which previously he believed to be true
gives him good ground for believing that there are undetected errors in his latest
book. (p. 205)
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inconsistency is not between generic and specific sentences, but between
two specific sentences. (p. 11)

The idea is that the preface's author can hold a pair of logically incompatible beliefs
because the two concern sentences that are of different types technically, given that the
author does not believe that a particular assertion he made is both true and false. Yet,
since proposal (N) suggests two contradictory beliefs that involve two specific
sentences, the idea underlying “the paradox of the preface” is inapplicable to the study
of self-deception, and we still have to find a way to address the combination without
causing the static paradox.

As discussed in the previous sections, there are many other proposals for
addressing the two elements other than proposal (N), though all these proposals end up
lending support to the doxastic approach. Thus, based on previous discussions, I
suggest two more proposals for further discussion:65

(O) A full belief + a degree of belief > 0.5
(P) A degree of belief > 0.5 + a contrary degree of belief > 0.5

I argued that Mele’s (2012) account actually implies the attribution of a degree
of belief that not-p, which is over 0.5, in section 2.3.3. By putting this idea and his
whole view together, it turns out that his view suggests we should attribute the
conjunction of a degree of belief that not-p, which is over 0.5, and a full belief that p to
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The reason why those suggested degrees of belief have to be over 0.5 was discussed in
section 2.3.1 and section 2.4.
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the self-deceived subject. Hence we have proposal (O). But Porcher (2012) casts some
doubt on this attribution:

[H]ow can someone hold a belief that p and a belief that not-p (albeit of
different degrees of confidence) at the same time? (p. 76)
The idea is that, although the level of confidence in not-p is reduced, the static paradox
remains since the possessor still counts as believing the two contrary beliefs
simultaneously.

Then, recall the previously discussed Archer’s view, which I argued that it
suggests the attribution of D(p) and also the attribution of D(~p) to self-deceived
subjects. By putting the two together, we have a prototype of proposal (P). But it
appears that this approach will create its version of static paradox. For the moment, let
us assume that this proposal is acceptable. On the one hand, in order to explain the
actions which seem to suggest the belief that p (for example, verbal expression of huge
support for p), we have to attribute corresponding affective attitudes, such as a strong
hope that p, which entail a high degree of belief that p and a low degree of belief that
not-p to the self-deceived subject.66 On the other hand, to explain why the subject
consciously avoids the unwelcome evidence (which shows the subject possesses
sufficient information for concluding that not-p), we need to attribute other affective
attitudes, such as a strong suspicion that not-p, which entail a low degree of belief that

p and a high degree of belief that not-p to the subject.67 This leads to an obvious
66

Recall that verbal endorsement of p is one of the phenomenological features of
self-deception.
67 More importantly, self-deceived subjects are required to be aware of the evidence that
overall warrants that not-p, which already suggests a high degree of belief that not-p.
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problem that, if we are required to attribute both a high degree of belief that p and a
high degree of belief that not-p to the subject, we will then be forced to suggest an
impossible state of mind, which leads to the static paradox again.

2.6.3 The strategy of temporal partitioning
Another attempt to dispose of the static paradox would be to invoke the strategy
of “temporal partitioning,” which suggests that a self-deceived subject can hold
contradictory beliefs consecutively.68 If we accept that a doxastic attitude towards p
can change from the state of disbelieving to the state of believing as time goes on, the
problem of simultaneously holding contrary beliefs will disappear, and the static
paradox would be solved. Nevertheless, the strategy of temporal partitioning is flawed
because of two problems. First, recall that we touched on the case of “rich life” when
introducing the strategy in section 2.2.1. If we compare this case with other cases we
have discussed, we will see that “rich life” is not a usual representation of
self-deception. In particular, the success of Sammy’s self-deceitful project relies on
some special mechanisms which are rarely found in other cases, for example, long
processing time, completely fake pieces of evidence, and suffering from Alzheimer's
disease. More importantly, there is no reason to think that there is room for the
expected tension to be present if the case of “rich life” is temporally extended. When
Sammy obtains the necessary attitude, he already forgot the truth (and his self-deceitful
project), and his evidence as a whole is in favor of p (despite being fake). In this sense,
he will never be able to recognize a clash between the evidence and the necessary

68

See section 2.2.1 for more details on this strategy.
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attitude after the acquisition of that necessary attitude even if his self-deception is
temporally extended.

2.6.4 The shifting view
Chan and Rowbottom (2019) argue that the failure of proposal (O) and proposal
(P) provides support to the shifting view of degrees of belief, which seems to offer a
more plausible explanation of the mechanisms behind self-deception. The shifting view
of degrees of belief suggests:

[T]here are situations in which individuals’ degrees of belief are highly
sensitive to relatively subtle changes in context [...] Thus a person might
profess belief in a proposition in one class of contexts because she believes
it in those contexts, and behave as if she doesn’t believe it in another class
of contexts because she doesn’t believe it in those contexts … High
confidence might be apparent in assertion, and middling confidence might
be apparent in action, for instance. (Chan and Rowbottom, 2019, p.
1204-1205)

It should not sound odd to any of us that beliefs may change in response to changes in
context, for example:

As I type, I am highly confident that the Earth will not be destroyed in the
next decade. But if I were shortly to see on the news that a moon-sized
asteroid is set to collide with Earth in the next year—it is not April 1!—then
my confidence in Earth’s survival past ten years into the future would drop
sharply. (Rowbottom, 2016, p. 737)
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Following this idea, we can assert that in a case of self-deception, a belief (or degree
thereof) that p and a belief (or degree thereof) that not-p might shift in one way and
another between 0 and 1, so that the involved subject can hold the two beliefs
consecutively.69 Proposal (P) would then be characterized by the following
attributions:

I.

A self-deceived subject believes that p with a degree of confidence that can
shift between 0 and 1.

II.

A self-deceived subject believes that not-p with a degree of confidence that can
shift between 0 and 1.

As this does not require a self-deceived subject to believe both p and not-p at the same
time, no static paradox arises.70

However, solving the static paradox does not imply solving the distinction
problem, which is our original goal. In fact, the mentioned attributions can also exist in
the model of willful ignorance or wishful thinking, since proposal (P) does not require
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The sum of this combination must be equal to 1 at any time (Eriksson and Hájek, 2007).
According to Lynch (2012), the notion of “degrees of belief” can be understood as “a datum
that there are such things, represented as they are in such everyday locutions as when we claim
to be or feel fully convinced or certain, very convinced, fairly convinced, not very convinced,
not at all convinced, etc., that p” (p. 438). Note that we need not accept that beliefs must come
in degrees for defending that beliefs may shift because of changes in context. One can reject
the idea that there is something like a continuum between fully believing p and fully believing
not-p while still asserting that beliefs may be context-sensitive. Yet, there is a conceptual
reason why the study of self-deception should probably be grounded in the assumption that
attitudes (such as beliefs) may come in degrees, which is related to what we have seen in
section 2.6.1. As Lynch (2012) illustrates, self-deceived subjects should more or less be
affected by the force of good evidence when they encounter it, since they are normally rational
beings (p. 442). Accordingly, it is unreasonable to think that they can be fully convinced that p
(namely, form a full belief that p) as if the evidence is actually in favor of p, given that the
available evidence actually suggests not-p in cases of self-deception. Incidentally, even if it
turns out that we should not follow the doxastic approach, Lynch (2016) states that other
propositional attitudes such as suspicion also come in degrees (p. 509).
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that a subject’s degrees of belief will (or are liable to) shift dramatically from believing
to disbelieving during the phenomenon.71 And so, the distinction problem remains. As
mentioned in section 2.3.4, the distinction problem should be solved by restricting the
combination of the access-to-information-element and the
unwarranted-attitude-element in a suitable way. Recall previous discussions in which
we find that the combination has to be specified as the conjunction of a belief (or
degree thereof) that p and a belief (or degree thereof) that not-p. Thus, it is necessary to
clearly indicate that the two degrees of belief will be over 0.5 consecutively during
self-deception in order to address the two elements properly.72 Therefore, I propose we
further restrict the attributions, as follows:

III.

A self-deceived subject believes that p with a degree of confidence that shifts
between 0 and 1, and there will be occasions during the phenomenon when the
value is over 0.5.

IV.

A self-deceived subject believes that not-p with a degree of confidence that
shifts between 0 and 1, and there will be occasions during the phenomenon
when the value is over 0.5.

Nevertheless, something is still missing from the conjunction of III and IV.
Since the conjunction does not explicitly require the expected tension to occur when
self-deception is temporally extended, it can also be attributed to Sammy in the case of
“rich life.” Yet, the case of “rich life” is grounded in a flawed view about
self-deception, so the conjunction must not be attributable to Sammy. It seems that the

71

That is to say, proposal (P) does not require that a subject must believe that p and not-p
consecutively. In this sense, we can also attribute the conjunction of I and II to a wishful
thinker, though she never believes that not-p during her wishful thinking.
72 Note that this does not imply that it is necessary for self-deception to be temporally
extended.
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conjunction of III and IV is not enough for solving the issue at hand. Hence it appears
that we have to deal with the issue by directly appealing to the idea of the expected
tension. But this might lead to the failure of avoiding to turn the expected tension into a
necessary factor. Some might even suspect that the adoption of the shifting view must
cause a loss of the expected cognitive tension since it leaves no room for a direct clash
between the awareness of contrary evidence and the necessary attitude(s). However, I
believe that the conjunction of III and IV is still useful in providing an initial idea for
solving the distinction problem. As such, it will be further elaborated and ameliorated
in chapter 3.

2.7 Lessons learned
The failure of the many available proposals introduced in this chapter has shed
light on how to look at the whole issue in a new way. The most important outcome of
this chapter is that we have come up with an initial scheme and drawn some useful
conclusions:

(a) We should capture what makes self-deception a unique phenomenon by
specifying the combination of the access-to-information-element and the
unwarranted-attitude-element.
(b) The aforementioned combination should be explained in terms of doxastic
attitudes.
(c) The combination has to make room for the expected tension to occur without
turning it into a necessary factor in the phenomenon.
(d) We can solve the static paradox by appeal to the idea that a certain belief (or
degree thereof) may shift when one changes situation.
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I suggest that we continue our study by further ameliorating the conjunction of III and
IV while keeping these conclusions in mind. Furthermore, I would like to put forward
two suggestions that are grounded in previous discussions:

(e) Maybe we could solve the issue by a straightforward assertion that the
combination is characteristic of a special kind of instability.
(f) It may be possible that III and IV should be combined to form one single
attitude that shifts between two ends.

A possible problem with (f) is that it seemingly implies that one of the two elements
should be eliminated. If this were the case, a strong reason would be needed to justify
the decision, which will be discussed in chapter 3. Inspired by the conjunction of III
and IV, I will be developing a view aimed at highlighting the unstable nature of
self-deception, as revealed by the combination of the two elements, in the next chapter.
Hopefully, my view can solve the distinction problem while allowing for the diversity
of self-deception.
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CHAPTER III - SOLVING THE DISTINCTION PROBLEM WITH THE
INSTABILITY VIEW
3.1 Moving forward to the discussion of the necessary attitude(s) involved in
self-deception
Studying self-deception has led us to the investigation of the difference(s)
between self-deception and other similar phenomena and hence the distinction
problem. In chapter 2, we examined in detail different proposals for solving the
distinction problem and developed several guiding principles for how to tackle the
problem. First, in order to establish self-deception as a unique phenomenon, we need to
find a suitable way to restrict the combination of the access-to-information-element and
the unwarranted-attitude-element. Second, in light of the failure of various suggestions
on how to specify the two elements, we learned that we should account for the
combination by the attribution of contradictory doxastic attitudes. Third, the static
paradox brought by this contradictory-beliefs proposal could be solved by the shifting
view. Finally, the combination is required to manifest some sort of tension (including
the expected tension) without making the expected tension to be a necessary factor in
the phenomenon.

A tentative plan to solve the distinction problem has been sketched out in
section 2.6.4, but some concerns remain. The relatively pressing issue is that even if we
can account for the combination without generating the static paradox, we might lose
the expected cognitive tension that is supposed to be present if self-deception is
temporally extended. Besides, some may wonder if there is a more concise way to
address the combination. I propose that these two issues are closely related to a
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particular misconception concerning how to arrange the basic structure of
self-deception, which, when clarified, will be able to provide a solid argument that the
static paradox is just a “red herring.” And as such, the idea of cognitive tension has to
be understood in a new fashion. Moreover, these findings will indicate that the unstable
nature of the necessary attitude(s) is closely related to the study of the distinction
problem.

3.1.1 The static paradox and the idea of cognitive tension
Some might worry that if we want to address the combination by the attribution
of a pair of contradictory doxastic attitudes without omitting the expected (cognitive)
tension, we will follow the footsteps of intentionalists and end in deadlock. This worry
is not baseless. Theorists who attempt to maintain this expected (cognitive) tension
have eventually been led to attribute a pair of simultaneous contradictory beliefs to the
self-deceived subject (Graham, 1986, p. 228).73 Given what we have seen in section
1.2 and section 2.6, this simultaneous contradictory-beliefs proposal seems likely to
make us either suggest a paradoxical model of self-deception or reject it flatly by
turning to non-intentionalist approaches (which do not agree to make such attribution).
But I am afraid this deadlock is merely caused by a misconception about the basic
structure of self-deception, which has led to the static paradox becoming so challenging
for intentionalists, non-intentionalists, or proponents of a mixed strategy alike.
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Even if one agrees to attribute a pair of contradictory doxastic attitudes to the self-deceived
subject, one needs not be an intentionalist when one disagrees to introduce “an intention to
deceive” into the model of self-deception. However, one cannot be a non-intentionalist when
one argues for such attribution, given that one of the main claims made by non-intentionalists
is the opposition to such attribution.
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Incidentally, we will also find the shifting view to be more convincing after rearranging
the basic structure.

Previous discussions reveal that theorists tend to presume that the awareness of
the available evidence and the necessary attitude(s) should be considered to be
independent from, and without direct connection between, each other. For
intentionalists, this presumption may stem from them considering a subject, who
engages in self-deception, as a conjunction of a deceiver and a deceived (though one
does not have to insist on such a presumption to defend intentionalism). Recall that
intentionalists argue that in a real case of self-deception, the involved subject has a
belief that not-p and an intention to deceive herself and thus engages in an irrational
cognition that will eventually make her acquire a belief that p. Concerning how to
arrange the two beliefs in question, intentionalists normally suppose that the two are
separately held by two conceptually different “agents” during the phenomenon of
self-deception (Bermúdez, 2000; Davidson, 2004b; Rorty, 1988; Sorensen, 1985).
Based on this perspective, it seems natural for them to infer that there might be no
direct connection between the two beliefs.74 As mentioned in section 1.1.1 and section
2.2.1, different versions of intentionalism can be divided into two subgroups. And, for
those who adopt the psychological strategy, they unanimously accept that the
awareness of the available evidence (which overall warrants that not-p) will not be
affected by the acquisition or the maintenance of the necessary attitude (Davidson,
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I do not intend to imply that social factors cannot affect one’s changes in beliefs (and other
propositional attitudes). But it is hard to imagine a situation in which there is a necessary
connection between A’s degree of belief that p and B’s degree of belief that not-p, and thus, the
former's loss is the later’s gain (and vice versa).
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2004b; Rorty, 1988).75 Accordingly, the intentionalist model proposed by these
theorists allows a belief that not-p to coexist with a belief that p, and this is how the
static paradox is generated (see Figure 1).

75

We should note that even if we adopt the strategy of temporal partitioning, this does not
suggest that we agree that the acquisition of the necessary attitude must lead to loss of the
awareness of the available evidence. In fact, the leading proponents of this strategy, Bermúdez
(2000) and Sorensen (1985), do not intend to assert that a self-deceived subject must lose her
belief that not-p when she obtains a belief that p. While both Bermúdez (2000) and Sorensen
(1985) contend that we should not require a self-deceived subject to constantly hold a pair of
contradictory beliefs during self-deception, their model still allows the possibility that the
subject could hold an unconscious belief that not-p after the acquisition of a belief that p.
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At the same time, non-intentionalists also take the presumption for granted,
even though the primary motivation for adopting non-intentionalist approaches is to
completely reject the interpersonal model (thus avoid the two paradoxes thoroughly).
This structural uniformity allows the non-intentionalist picture of self-deception to fit
in very well with the one provided by intentionalists. To illustrate, let us take Archer’s
(2013) non-doxastic view as a representative of non-intentionalist views to determine
whether it fits the intentionalist model of self-deception mentioned above.

As discussed in section 1.1.2.2, Archer (2013) specifies the content of the basic
elements of self-deception by appeal to psychological categories other than “belief.” In
Archer’s (2013) view, a suspicion that not-p represents the awareness of the available
evidence, while a hope that p acts for the necessary attitude. We should also note that
the degrees (or strength) of these two propositional attitudes have to be high enough in
order to reveal the nature of the available evidence and explain the “as-if-p” behavior
of self-deceived subjects (see section 2.3.3 and section 2.4.2 for more details). Given
these points, in Archer’s (2013) non-doxastic model of self-deception, the combination
of a (strong) suspicion that not-p and a desire to believe that p causes an involved
subject to engage in a biased cognition, in which a (strong) hope that p can thus be
acquired (or retained) in the teeth of contrary evidence (p. 279). It is noteworthy that
although the access-to-information-element is a causal condition of the
unwarranted-attitude-element, there is no sign that it will be affected by the production
or maintenance of the necessary attitude(s) in this non-doxastic model. Archer (2013)
even affirms that the two elements coexist during self-deception (p. 279). Now, it
should be evident that the structure of Archer’s non-doxastic model is the same as that
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of intentionalist models. In fact, the situation will be the same even if we take other
non-intentionalist views for comparison. See Figure 2 for the model of Archer’s
non-doxastic view.
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Typically, non-intentionalists who presuppose this structural pattern have been
restricted to deal with the static paradox created by the (simultaneous)
contradictory-beliefs proposal in restricted ways, namely, those related to the content of
the basic elements only. However, the question that can be raised here is whether such
a restriction is unnecessary. The fact is that neither the “vague consensus” nor the
relevant empirical evidence provides a reason to think that a self-deceived subject will
somehow keep the awareness of the available evidence apart from the production or
maintenance of the necessary attitude(s) constantly during her self-deception. The
structural pattern suggested becomes even more problematic when we consider that the
awareness of the available evidence and the necessary attitude(s) are supposed to be
inside a single agent’s (conscious) mind (see section 2.3.1 for a discussion on why the
access-to-information-element cannot be separated from the subject’s conscious mind).
The idea is that, when one is engaging in a particular cognitive process for promoting
the acquisition or maintenance of a belief that p, one is simultaneously undermining
one’s reason for believing that not-p. It sounds abnormal to say one still retains a belief
that not-p when one has already succeeded in obtaining a belief that p, given that the
falsehood of not-p should have already been established at that time.

Here, I suggest that a more intuitive description of how the two beliefs are
affected by the self-deceiving process is as follows: the self-deceiving process weakens
a belief that not-p and the belief that not-p finally becomes a disbelief that not-p at the
conclusion section of the process (which is identical to a belief that p). This description
is more intuitive in the sense that we should be familiar with cases where people
change their minds when there are changes in the situation (see section 2.6.4 for an
113

example). With this description in mind, we have no reason to maintain that the
awareness of the available evidence and the necessary attitude(s) must coexist.
Additionally, if we already know that one cannot believe both p and not-p, why should
we presume a structural pattern that allows such a situation to happen? Even if we
insist on following the affective approach suggested by Archer (2013), for example, the
same situation will still emerge because it is also implausible for one to strongly hope
that p while at the same time strongly suspect that not-p is true (Chan and Rowbottom,
2019, p. 1211).76

Thus, through a rearrangement of the structure, the true face of the phenomenon
of self-deception is unveiled. Specifically, it is not a phenomenon in which a subject is
motivated to engage in an irrational cognition for forming (or retaining) the necessary
attitude(s) that independent from, and without direct connection with, the awareness of
the available evidence (which overall warrants not-p). Rather, a minimal account of
self-deception makes it a cognitive process in which the awareness is transformed into
the necessary attitude(s). In this sense, the awareness and the necessary attitude(s) are
not allowed to coexist since the loss (or the transformation) of the awareness should be
a necessary accompaniment for the gain (or regainment) of necessary attitude(s) (see
Figure 3).
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Some may insist that it is possible for one to (strongly) hope that p even if one is aware that
the reality is quite otherwise. I do not intend to assert that it is impossible for people to strongly
hope that p at T2 despite being aware of the strong evidence to the contrary at T1. After all, a
fast shifting from despair to hope may occur when changes in other propositional attitudes are
triggered. However, I do not think it is possible for one to have a strong hope that p is true at
the very moment that one strongly suspects that not-p is true.
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However, some may question whether the expected cognitive tension will be
omitted from the basic structure of self-deception mentioned above, since the shifting
nature inherent in the structure does not allow the two elements to coexist when
self-deception is temporally extended. As mentioned in section 2.6.1, the origin of the
expected cognitive tension is dissatisfaction caused by the gap between the “reality”
(which refers to one’s understanding of what the world is based on the evidence one
possesses) and a belief that p (or any attitude that can roughly play the role of a belief
that p). Some regard this as a solid foundation for suggesting a direct clash within the
simultaneous existence of contradictory attitudes (Graham, 1986, p. 228). Conversely, I
find it more compelling to suggest that such dissatisfaction implies a sharp shift from
“believing that p” to “disbelieving that p.” It is important to note that a recognition of
the gap does not require one to have the belief that p at the very moment of having that
recognition. Rather, when one recognizes that the available evidence is inconsistent
with what one is motivated to endorse, one already establishes the falsehood of the
proposition that one has (mistakenly) supported, namely p, and thus disbelieves that p
(or believes that not-p). In this sense, it turns out that the idea of the expected cognitive
tension probably indicates the occurrence of a sharp shift(s) in one’s doxastic state.

Now we might put all these ideas together. We have already seen that the
access-to-information-element is a causal condition of the acquisition (or regainment)
of the unwarranted-attitude-element, and the two elements are directly connected but
not allowed to coexist. Hence Bermúdez (2000) mentions that “it seems plausible that
[a self-deceived subject’s] confidence in p will be inversely proportional to [her]
confidence in non-p” (p. 313). In other words, the two elements might be closely
116

connected in the sense that one’s loss could be another’s gain, and vice versa. But it
seems to me that Bermúdez’s (2000) idea is too weak. Given the aforementioned basic
structure of self-deception, I think it is not only plausible, but in fact necessary, to
consider the two elements as an integrated entity that switches from one end to the
other – which already indicates the adoption of a shifting view (see section 2.6.4 for an
explanation of the shifting view about degrees of belief), despite the limited frequency
of switching. Nevertheless, there is no theoretical reason to impose such a restriction
on the integrated entity. Thus, in order to leave room for the expected tension to occur,
we can simply affirm that the necessary attitude(s) should be able to shift again when
self-deception is temporally extended (see Figure 4).
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In summary, through reconsidering the basic structure of self-deception, we
have clarified the relation between the two elements and their characteristic. Now it
should be clear that there is no way for us to simultaneously attribute two contradictory
cognitive representations to a self-deceived subject during the whole self-deceiving
process, regardless of how they are encoded in the mind of the subject. Hence the static
paradox is just a “red herring.” Furthermore, given the revised structural pattern of
self-deception, “shifting” is not merely an ad hoc cure for the static paradox but plays
an essential role in this phenomenon.

3.1.2 The necessary attitude(s) involved in self-deception and its characteristic
At this point, we have established that the two elements should be construed as
an integrated entity that is liable to shift back and forth between two ends. Hence we do
not need to address this combination by deliberately attributing the conjunction of two
distinct beliefs to the self-deceived subject. Instead, we only have to assign a full belief
concerning p or a degree of belief concerning p, which is liable to dramatically shift
back and forth between “believing p” and “disbelieving p,” to the subject (while
keeping in mind that a belief that p and a disbelief that not-p are two sides of the same
coin).

Nevertheless, the conclusion drawn from the discussion of the structure of
self-deception is more sophisticated than we initially thought. Given that we are
concerned with the distinction problem, this conclusion actually leads us to emphasize
the unstable nature, rather than the precise content, of the integrated entity.77 Recall
77

Yet, some cases involving such instability are not examples of self-deception, so long as
other basic elements of self-deception are absent. Recall that our study of the distinction
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that we have to address what makes self-deception unique by specifying this integrated
entity in a way that makes the involved subject believe p and not-p consecutively
during self-deception. As mentioned in section 2.6.4, we cannot fulfill this task by
appeal to the idea of “shifting degrees of belief” only since this idea does not require
one’s belief to be liable to shift dramatically.78 Admittedly, even if we consider the
integrated entity to be a degree of belief concerning p that can shift between the two
ends, the entity should be relatively stable (namely not liable to shift) when the
available evidence does support the disbelief that p. Yet, in the phenomenon of
self-deception, this integrated entity is dramatically unstable in the sense that it has to
shift substantially during the transition from the consideration section to the conclusion
section, and it is liable to shift again (for one or more times) if self-deception is
temporally extended. Accordingly, our focal point should be the fact that this entity is
characteristic of a special kind of instability since this is what makes it possible for the
subject’s belief concerning p to be liable to shift back and forth. More importantly, by
giving weight to the characteristic of this entity instead of the content of it, we can
successfully address the expected tension without turning it into a necessary factor of
self-deception.

Following from the above, I contend that we should not accord equal
importance to the two elements that constitute the integrated entity. As mentioned in
section 1.2.5, the unwarranted-attitude-element indicates the necessary attitude(s),

problem aims at finding the difference(s) between self-deception and other phenomena that
have significant commonalities. What I intend to argue is that, if all basic elements and this sort
of instability are present in a particular case, it is an example of self-deception.
78 Even if self-deception is not temporally extended, the involved subject must believe p and
not-p consecutively during self-deception in order to account for the
access-to-information-element and the unwarranted-attitude-element.
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namely an unwarranted attitude(s) concerning p (while its acquisition or maintenance is
grounded in, or at least related to, the self-deceiving process). We used to think that the
unwarranted nature of a certain attitude can only be addressed by restricting the content
of it.79 Yet, I believe this unwarranted nature can also be addressed by specifying the
nature of that particular attitude. Let us assume that the available evidence supports
not-p (which is one of the necessary conditions for the occurrence of self-deception).
Under this circumstance, if an attitude concerning p is affected by the power of such
evidence properly, it should be relatively stable in character. For example, if it is a
degree of belief that p, its value will only alternate between 0 and 0.5 (except being
affected by other psychological factors or the like), which makes it count as
disbelieving that p at all times. In contrast, if a particular attitude concerning p is
unstable in character (which means it is liable to shift dramatically for one or more
times), it is fair to consider it as displaying a notable difference from what the available
evidence warrants, namely being unwarranted.

Thus, I suggest that we should adopt a new understanding of the idea of “the
necessary attitude(s),” namely, once the integrated entity has been given an unstable
nature through the self-deceiving process, we can say it already counts as the necessary
attitude(s) involved in self-deception, regardless of its current content.80 In other
words, the unwarranted-attitude-element should be considered to be prevalent
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Suppose the available evidence supports not-p. We used to think that if a particular attitude
is unwarranted, we have to specify the content of it as something incompatible with the
available evidence, such as “a disbelief that not-p.”
80 I do not mean that an attitude can only be given such an unstable nature through a
self-deceiving process. Surely, other kinds of cognition can also lead to this result. But I
believe that it is impossible for those phenomena that share significant commonalities with
self-deception to influence their necessary attitudes in this way.
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throughout the temporally extended part of self-deception, even though it is liable to
shift back and forth between “believing that p” and “disbelieving that p” persistently in
this part. This is because even when the content of the necessary attitude shifts into
“disbelieving that p” at some point in time during the reconsideration section, this
attitude has already been given an unstable nature in the sense that it is destined to shift
back into “believing that p” again. Otherwise, we have to say the involved subject,
namely the possessor, has already stopped her self-deception at the very moment when
she regains a disbelief that p, or D(p) < 0.5. (Depending on the existence of the
access-to-information-element in the beginning, we can even doubt whether it is a case
of self-deception to begin with.) See Figure 5 for an illustration of the situation where
D(p) < 0.5 does not shift back to D(p) > 0.5.81

81

This situation happens probably because the motivation for self-deceiving is gone.
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Here, I would like to offer a short summary of my findings to this point. I have
clarified the basic features of the phenomenon of self-deception, which in turn can help
us shape a final scheme to solve the distinction problem. In particular, we have been
led to focus on the characteristic of the necessary attitude(s) involved in self-deception.
In the following section, I am going to elaborate on a solution that emphasizes the
characteristic of the necessary attitude(s). I will call this solution the instability view.

3.2 The instability view
The central theme of the instability view is that a special kind of instability
inherent in the necessary attitude(s) involved in self-deception can help us distinguish
the phenomenon from other nearby phenomena. As mentioned previously, since the
available evidence should support not-p in a real case of self-deception, the involved
subject’s attitude towards p should overall be relatively stable, that is, it should count
as disbelieving that p at all times (except being affected by other psychological factors
or the like). But this attitude is endowed with an unstable nature through the
self-deceiving process and thus is liable to shift back and forth between the two
extremes of “believing that p” and “disbelieving that p.” It is not difficult for us to find
examples in which this kind of instability plays a decisive role in determining whether
a given case should count as self-deception. Recall that when the young man in the
case of “one-sided love” appears to be continuously sliding between believing p and
not-p in the face of evidence supporting not-p, we tend to consider him as
self-deceiving.
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We should note that this unstable nature has to be grounded in how the
relationship between one’s motivational state and the threatening data affects one’s
attitude towards a particular proposition. Thus, some prerequisites have to be fulfilled
to enable an attitude to become unstable in character. First, an involved subject has to
be a generally rational being, who is susceptible to what the natural implications of the
available evidence are. As mentioned earlier, self-deception should not involve
abnormal psychology. Accordingly, any subject who is involved in self-deception must
be ordinary people who are “in general, intellectually able and rational, and are
consequently not completely immune to the force of good evidence when they
encounter it” (Lynch, 2012, p. 442). Second, the subject has to have a subjective
reason(s) (i.e. a motivation(s)) that can cause her to embrace a particular proposition
(p).82 This is manifested as the motivation-element in self-deception, as we have seen
in section 1.2.3 and section 2.2. Third, the available evidence must give greater warrant
for not-p than for p, and therefore the subject has an epistemic reason not to embrace p.
Given that the available evidence must support not-p in self-deception, it is easy to see
that the third prerequisite can be fulfilled by the phenomenon of self-deception. The
combination of these three prerequisites provides a situation in which the subject’s
attitude towards p is apt to vacillate between two ends. Once a subject engages in a
particular process of irrational cognition under this situation, it is very likely that she is
self-deceiving herself.
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Since I do not intend to solve the motivational issue, I will not specify what this “subjective
reason” is. We can just assume that any reason that can act as the motivation-element of
self-deception will do (see section 1.2.3 for a discussion of the motivation-element). Still, I
tend to think that it is a desire that p (see section 2.2 for a discussion of how to specify the
content of the motivation-element).
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3.2.1 The ontology of the instability view
The instability view is based on several assumptions concerning the definition
of self-deception and the notion of propositional attitude, which have been discussed in
detail in the previous sections. Yet a brief synopsis of them should be useful for
articulating the view. The conditions are as follows:

1.

The vast majority of theories available in the literature of self-deception
target the same kind of phenomenon, despite misconceptions about its
precise description.

2.

If 1 is right, there should be some commonalities among these theories,
which work as a common ground for any theoretical question arising
about “self-deception.” I call this common ground the “vague consensus.”

3.

The content of the “vague consensus” is as follows:
3.A.

Self-deception is a real kind of motivated (human)

irrationality.83
3.B.

The combination of three basic elements constitutes this

irrationality.
3.C.

These elements are “motivation,” “access to

information,” and “unwarranted attitude.”
4.

The motivation-element should be specified as a subjective reason(s) for
one to engage in the phenomenon.84

5.

The access-to-information-element should be specified as an awareness
of the available evidence, which overall warrants that not-p, and it must
be represented in terms of propositional attitudes.

6.

The unwarranted-attitude-element should be specified as an unwarranted
attitude(s) towards p necessarily involved in self-deception while its

83

Note also that this implies that self-deception is not a phenomenon of abnormal psychology
(namely unmotivated irrationality), and thus, any subject involved in it should be a generally
rational being.
84 This element can also be understood as the motivation that makes one try hard to embrace p.
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acquisition or maintenance is grounded in, or at least related to, the
cognitive process involved in the phenomenon.
7.

The awareness of the available evidence and the unwarranted attitude(s)
towards p can be considered as one integrated entity.

8.

This integrated entity is not inside of one’s unconscious mind.

9.

This integrated entity becomes unstable in character through the
self-deceiving process, and thus, is liable to shift back and forth between
two ends when one changes context.

10.

Once the integrated entity is endowed with an unstable nature, we can
directly consider it as an unwarranted attitude(s) towards p necessarily
involved in self-deception, regardless of its current precise content.

Note that we need not insist that 10 has to be right for the instability view to work in
practice. We might adopt a broader approach as long as we can still lay emphasis on
the unstable nature. Furthermore, although the instability view is developed from an
initial scheme suggesting that the integrated entity should be explained in terms of
doxastic attitudes, it turns out that the view can accommodate other approaches on how
to address the integrated entity. This entity can be defined in terms of other kinds of
propositional attitudes (such as affective attitudes) as long as it can remain unstable in
character. Admittedly, if the access-to-information-element and the
unwarranted-attitude-element were allowed to be explained in terms of propositional
attitudes other than beliefs, we would have more than one reasonable solution to the
distinction problem. However, for the purpose of this study, my intention is to argue
that the instability view is a promising, rather than the only, solution.

3.2.2 The advantage of the instability view
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In the previous section, I noted that it is not necessary to insist on the doxastic
approach in defending the instability view (although I do insist on following the
doxastic approach for addressing the exact content of the two elements). This, in fact,
highlights the primary advantage of the instability view, namely, it can characterize the
uniqueness of self-deception without limiting its generality, thus leaving room for
future research on other aspects of, and theoretical questions stemming from,
self-deception.

Despite some prerequisites, the instability view does not impose any strict
restriction on the content of the three basic elements of self-deception. The view still
works even if both the awareness of the available evidence and the necessary
attitude(s) need not be understood in terms of doxastic attitudes. To illustrate, suppose
the integrated entity must be explained with the avowal view, which suggests
attributing the conjunction of an avowal of p and a belief that not-p to a self-deceived
subject (Audi, 1982).85 Given that a belief that not-p can also guide both a subject’s
verbal and non-verbal actions, there is a conflict between these two attitudes (albeit
maybe in a less extreme sense).86 We can then combine these two attitudes into an
integrated entity that is liable to switch between two ends, as in the doxastic approach.
Once the two attitudes are construed as an integrated entity, we can easily apply the
instability view to the framework.
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Audi (1982) tries to limit the connection between verbal behavior and this belief that not-p
by understanding the belief as an unconscious one. But I have already argued that the
awareness of the available evidence should not be outside of a self-deceived subject’s
conscious mind (as stated in section 2.3.1). Hence I will not consider it to be unconscious.
86 Undoubtedly, the (empirical) evidence of the awareness of the available evidence is largely
non-verbal behavior. But there is no theoretical reason to limit its connection with verbal
behavior if it is represented by a (conscious) belief that not-p. It is possible for a self-deceived
subject to insincerely defend for p, which shows that she knows that not-p.
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The same is true even if we replace the avowal view with other views, such as
the indeterminate approach. If we follow the indeterminate approach, the product of
self-deception will then be the partial fulfillment of the conditions for fitting the
folk-psychological stereotype for “believing that p” (Funkhouser, 2009; Porcher, 2012;
Schwitzgebel, 2010).87 In this sense, we can only provide an indeterminate answer to
whether self-deceived subjects believe that p. But note that even though this is called
the indeterminate approach, a determinate answer to whether self-deceived subjects
believe that not-p is still required for representing the access-to-information-element.
Recall that self-deceived subjects should sufficiently meet the folk-psychological
stereotype for “believing that not-p” for fulfilling the requirement of “being aware of
the natural implication(s) of the available evidence that overall supports not-p.” In
other words, a total unfulfillment of the conditions for fitting the folk-psychological
stereotype for “believing that p” is required to address the
access-to-information-element, given that Schwitzgebel (2010) clearly states that the
conditions for counting as “believing that not-p” necessarily conflict with the
conditions for counting as “believing that p” (p. 544). So, it is fair to say we can still
understand the access-to-information-element and the unwarranted-attitude-element as
an integrated entity that is liable to switch between two ends in the context of the

87

As mentioned in section 2.4, since proponents of the indeterminate approach do not view the
idea of “belief” in a usual way, I assume that they tend to replace “necessary attitude(s)” with
the word “product” for avoiding misunderstanding. But this product can still represent the
unwarranted-attitude-element.
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indeterminate approach.88 Once again, when the two elements are construed as an
integrated entity, we can easily apply the instability view to the framework.

Moreover, as mentioned in section 1.3, some theorists suggest that there is more
than one type of self-deception. The fact that the instability view neither relies on
restricting the content of elements of self-deception nor precludes any particular type(s)
of self-deception, such as twisted cases and indifferent cases, is very beneficial for
ensuring the diversity in the phenomenon. Incidentally, the view is compatible with the
assumption that the case of “Joey” is a genuine example of self-deception (although I
have expressed some doubt as to the validity of such an assumption).

3.2.3 The mechanisms behind
If we accept that the future of the instability view looks very promising, an
explicit explanation of the mechanisms behind is crucial for complementing the view.
To ensure a thorough explanation, I will include the tension (including the expected
tension) and also the temporally extended part in the illustration. At the same time, to
avoid any misunderstanding, the idea of “integrated entity” will not be mentioned.
However, it is important to note that, once the attitude concerning p becomes unstable
in character and is liable to switch back and forth between two ends, we can consider it
as the necessary attitude involved in self-deception, regardless of its current content.

88

Admittedly, in the context of the indeterminate approach, the precise content of these two
elements will be much more sophisticated than we initially thought. Yet, this will not be an
obstacle to the formation of the integrated entity since the instability view does not require us
to specify the exact content of these two elements.
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Regarding real cases of “self-deception,” my observation is as follows: a
subject is aware that the available data provides greater warrant for not-p.
Nevertheless, the subject has a particular motivation, which makes it hard for her to
accept this situation.89 At the same time, cognitive tension is supposed to be generated
because of this uncomfortable situation. The interaction between the awareness and the
motivation causes the subject to act in a certain way to promote holding a particular
unwarranted attitude(s) concerning p.90 During this process, since the level of the
awareness of the available data is still high, the subject might behave in a way that
looks more consistent with the attribution of a belief that not-p (or the like).91 For
example, she could consciously avoid encountering sources of evidence suggesting that
not-p.92 When the subject successfully makes her attitude(s) towards p unstable in
character through the promoting process, the awareness of the available evidence will
be able to switch into an unwarranted attitude(s) towards p (namely a belief that not-p
or the like) at the conclusion section. Once the awareness is transformed into the
necessary attitude(s) involved in self-deception, cognitive tension will be reduced
correspondingly. At that moment, she might start to act in a way suggesting a belief
that p (or the like).

89

Some might think, and I agree, that the strength of this motivation is proportional to the
level of awareness of contrary-evidence. However, it is not necessary to include this into the
system.
90 There is much more to be said about how one can self-deceive oneself, so much that it
would require another thesis. I tend to prefer a mixed strategy. For example, Galeotti (2012)
argues that self-deception could be “an unintended outcome of intentional steps” taken by the
subject (p. 42). In other words, one could intentionally seek for considerations supportive of p
without aiming at deceiving oneself.
91 When the level of the awareness of the available data is low enough, it switches into an
unwarranted attitude(s) towards p.
92 As Funkhouser (2005) contends, such avoidance behavior shows that the agent already
possesses sufficient information for concluding that not-p.
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After drawing the conclusion, if the subject reconsiders the old evidence or
encounters new, unwelcoming pieces of evidence, the necessary attitude(s) will switch
back into an awareness of contrary evidence. This awareness will interact with the
motivation and lead to the promoting process again. Meanwhile, the expected tension
(a term I used to refer to the tension that occurs after the conclusion section) will
emerge until the subject regains the necessary attitude(s) involved in self-deception. In
addition, the subject might behave as if not-p during this reconsidering process. When
impartial observers view these events as a whole, they will likely be confused by the
“shifting” aspect in the behavior involved, leading them to mistakenly believe that the
subject is holding two conflicting attitudes simultaneously. See Figure 6 for an
illustration of the mechanisms behind.
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CONCLUSION
The task of this study is to determine the difference(s) between self-deception
and other nearby phenomena, especially wishful thinking and willful ignorance, which
I termed the distinction problem, and hence establish a firm foundation for future
research. In chapter 1, I introduced the distinction problem as an essential yet unsolved
issue, and emphasized the need for establishing the boundary of self-deception, lest we
risk taking specious cases or claims into consideration while developing a detailed
analysis of self-deception. This was followed by a review of the current literature on
self-deception, in which myriads of theories exist. Despite this, I proposed that a
“vague consensus” is present, albeit not fully sufficient for solving the distinction
problem.

With that in mind, I attempted to seek a reasonable solution to the distinction
problem by examining proposals described in the literature in chapter 2. Although
many of these fail to settle the problem, they are able to provide insight for solving it.
Based on the findings, it was determined that the doxastic approach is the most
appropriate for addressing the exact content of both the access-to-information-element
and the unwarranted-attitude-element. To be more precise, I discovered that we should
specify the combination in a way that makes one count as believing that p and not-p.
The problem with this specification, which is also the biggest obstacle to the final
scheme, is that it can cause a variant of the static paradox, which concerns an
impossible state of mind. To deal with this, I proposed an initial scheme based on the
shifting view about degrees of belief. Since the shifting view allows one to slide
between “believing that p” and “disbelieving that p,” no static paradox will arise. The
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downside of this scheme, though, is that it seemingly fails to address the expected
tension that is liable to be present when self deception is temporally extended, leading
to some doubts about the application of the shifting view.

In the final chapter, I developed a view which highlights the unstable nature of
self-deception revealed by the combination of the access-to-information-element and
the unwarranted-attitude-element. By rearranging the basic structure of self-deception,
I showed that the combination should be considered to be an integrated entity that is
unstable in character, and only calls for the attribution of a doxastic attitude concerning

p but not two distinct beliefs. Based on this finding, I pointed out that the shifting view
is not just an ad hoc cure but an essential concept in the study of self-deception. I also
stated that the idea of “(expected) cognitive tension” should be understood in a way
that does not require the simultaneous attribution of contradictory beliefs. Then, I
further elaborated on the idea and argued that by placing emphasis on the nature of this
integrated entity, a new understanding of the idea of “the necessary attitude(s) involved
in self-deception” will appear. Based on this new understanding, I argued that the
unwarranted nature of the necessary attitude(s) will be represented by the unstable
nature of an attitude(s) concerning p (which makes it possible that the attitude(s) is
liable to switch between two ends) instead of the current content of that attitude(s). At
the end of chapter 3, I articulated the content of the instability view and the ontology of
it. I also specified the advantage of the view and the mechanisms behind. Undoubtedly,
many theoretical questions regarding different aspects of self-deception still remain.
The aim of this thesis, nevertheless, is to build a solid foundation for future studies,
rather than a detailed analysis of the phenomenon. Hopefully, the instability view
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(combined with the “vague consensus”) can serve as the starting point for future
research on self-deception.
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